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PER SE BAD FAITH? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF GOOD 
FAITH IN CHAPTER 13 FEE-ONLY PLANS 
ABSTRACT 
Section 1325(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code requires chapter 13 plans to be 
“proposed in good faith and not by any means prevented by law.” 
Section 1325(a)(7) requires that “the action of the debtor in filing the petition 
was in good faith.” Courts evaluate both good faith provisions through a 
subjective inquiry into the totality of the circumstances in each case, typically 
using similar factors in the analysis. Many jurisdictions provide a list of 
factors for this assessment. Courts caution that any list is non-exhaustive and 
should not limit the subjective nature of the good faith inquiry. Some chapter 
13 plans propose to pay little more than the trustee and attorney fees, and 
leave nothing or a nominal repayment to general unsecured creditors. These 
so-called “fee-only” plans challenge one of the underlying goals of chapter 
13: a fair distribution of the debtor’s future income to repay creditors. While 
courts find most fee-only plans fail to satisfy the good faith requirements, three 
circuit courts have ruled that fee-only plans are not per se bad faith.  
This Comment provides insight into how courts are actually dealing with 
fee-only cases through an empirical study of good faith litigation over plans 
proposing zero or a nominal repayment to general unsecured creditors. This 
study compiles data and conducts a broad analysis of the factors that courts 
have listed and discussed in the totality of the circumstances test for good 
faith. This Comment hypothesizes that two particular variables are significant 
predictors of a court’s ruling on good faith: (1) the repayment to general 
unsecured creditors and (2) the number of factors discussed in the case. 
Analysis of the data does not support the first hypothesis but does support the 
second. This Comment concludes that, in the absence of a strong correlation 
between the number of factors and good faith rulings, courts should not 
overhaul the traditional good faith analysis when dealing with fee-only plans. 
This Comment suggests, however, one of the circuit court rulings may provide 
a modified approach that balances the benefits of a subjective, discretionary 
standard against the wide-ranging concern over plans that propose little or no 
repayment to general unsecured creditors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 “I am not going to allow these folks to come in here and pay lawyers,” 
proclaimed the bankruptcy judge.1 The judge had been curious why, other than 
an inability to pay the attorney fee up front, the debtor wished to file for 
chapter 13 relief instead of chapter 7.2 The attorney replied, “Well, the reason 
he wants to is because he wants some relief and he can't get it with a [c]hapter 
7 because he has no money.”3 But the judge replied, “And he has no money to, 
you have to finish the sentence, pay his lawyer.”4 
The judge suggested that the debtor need only save his proposed chapter 13 
payment for a few months, and then pay the attorney for a chapter 7 filing.5 
But for ethical reasons, the judge would not allow debtors to file for chapter 13 
relief merely to finance their attorney fees.6 If debtors cannot afford the fee up 
front, the judge explained, “I don't see how in the world you expect that they 
are going to be able to pay a five or three-year plan and not default and then, 
once they do, they are back in the soup again and they have made no 
headway.”7 
This exchange highlights the problems in chapter 13 bankruptcy with so-
called “fee-only” plans, which propose to pay the debtor’s attorney fees 
through plan payments while leaving nothing or a nominal amount to general 
unsecured creditors.8 In this case, as with many fee-only plans, the judge 
denied confirmation of the plan because it violated chapter 13’s good faith 
provisions under 11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a)(3) and 1325(a)(7).9 
When it enacted the modern Bankruptcy Code (Code),10 Congress included 
§ 1325(a)(3), an ambiguous confirmation requirement that “the plan has been 
proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law.”11 
 
 1  Brown v. Gore (In re Brown), 742 F.3d 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting from the transcript of the bankruptcy court’s confirmation hearing in the case). 
 2  Id. at 1312. 
 3  Id. 
 4  Id. 
 5  Id. at 1312. 
 6  Id. at 1313. 
 7  Id. 
 8  See, e.g., Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78, 80–81 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 9  Brown, 742 F.3d at 1313. 
 10  Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at title 11 of 
the United States Code). 
 11  11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (2012). 
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Unsurprisingly, the good faith standard spurred litigation.12 In 2005, Congress 
added § 1325(a)(7),13 another confirmation requirement that “the action of the 
debtor in filing the petition was in good faith.”14 In assessing good faith under 
both provisions, courts typically apply a totality of the circumstances test, 
which requires a fact-intensive inquiry in each case.15 Various lists of factors 
have emerged as a result, though courts acknowledge that these lists are not 
exhaustive.16 
Although the Code only requires general unsecured creditors in chapter 13 
to receive at least as much as they would in a hypothetical chapter 7 
liquidation,17 fee-only plans nevertheless challenge one of chapter 13’s 
primary goals: to distribute a debtor’s future income to repay creditors in lieu 
of liquidating the debtor’s assets.18 As one court explained, “[c]hapter 13 is 
titled ‘Adjustment of Debts of an Individual with Regular Income.’ [With fee-
only plans, debtors] are not adjusting anything, much less debt; they are 
canceling and eliminating the claims of creditors while simply paying their 
attorneys.”19 
“Fee-only” and other court-coined terms for these plans do not have a 
concrete definition.20 Regardless of the terminology, fee-only plans uniformly 
allow debtors the benefits of retaining their assets and financing their legal fees 
through a chapter 13 bankruptcy plan while offering little or nothing in return 
to general unsecured creditors.21 Three federal circuit courts have rejected the 
view that fee-only plans are bad faith per se.22 Though in one of the opinions, 
Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), the First Circuit seems to narrow their 
 
 12  Bradley M. Elbein, The Hole in the Code: Good Faith and Morality in Chapter 13, 34 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 439, 448 & n.47 (1997) (citing Conrad K. Cyr, The Chapter 13 “Good Faith” Tempest: An Analysis and 
Proposal For Change, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 271, 273 (1981)) (identifying at least 53 cases through 1981 and 
approximately 700 cases from 1981 to 1996 that litigated the chapter 13 good faith standard). 
 13  Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 
sec. 102(g)(3), § 1325(a), 119 Stat. 23, 33 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(7)). 
 14  11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(7) (emphasis added). 
 15  See, e.g., Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 16  See Elbein, supra note 12, at 454 (providing a list of consensus factors among courts, but also noting 
courts interpret the standard loosely and do not articulate exhaustive lists). 
 17  11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). 
 18  See In re Heard, 6 B.R. 876, 881 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1980). 
 19  In re Paley, 390 B.R. 53, 59 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 20  See infra Part II.A. 
 21  See infra Part II.A. 
 22  Brown v. Gore (In re Brown), 742 F.3d 1309, 1316 (11th Cir. 2014); Puffer, 674 F.3d at 85, 87–88; 
Sikes v. Crager (In re Crager), 691 F.3d 671, 675–76 (5th Cir. 2012). 
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treatment of fee-only plans within the totality of the circumstances test.23 No 
other circuits have definitively addressed the issue, and lower courts have 
taken various approaches.24  
Regardless of the approach, and despite the appellate courts’ unwillingness 
to adopt a per se rule so far, courts invariably view fee-only plans with a great 
deal of suspicion; as one court explained, “a heavy burden of proof” is required 
to rule that fee-only plans comply with chapter 13’s good faith requirements.25 
Although the Code doesn’t necessarily require any repayment to unsecured 
creditors in chapter 13,26 courts seem to acknowledge that something is 
inherently wrong with a chapter 13 plan that only exists to finance attorney 
(and court) fees.27 Where chapter 13 exists to allow debtors to repay debts 
through future income when they are able to do so,28 fee-only plans appear to 
be “little more than disguised [c]hapter 7 proceedings.”29 Perhaps this is the 
perfect place to examine the line between good faith and bad. When a chapter 
13 plan offers no more repayment to general unsecured creditors than a chapter 
7 liquidation, should courts adopt a per se rule against fee-only plans, or at 
least modify the totality of the circumstances test for good faith? Are any 
particular factors within the totality of the circumstances test more significant 
than others? 
This Comment addresses these questions by conducting an empirical 
analysis of chapter 13 fee-only plans, specifically the factors courts list and 
discuss in the totality of the circumstances test for good faith. This analysis 
provides insight on the actual application of those factors within the specific 
context of fee-only plans, and determines whether courts are indeed trending 
toward common considerations in ruling on good faith. To the author’s 
knowledge, the factors have not been studied empirically, and certainly not 
 
 23  Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2012). See infra Part II.B.1. 
 24  Puffer, 674 F.3d at 79. See also In re Barnes, No. 12-06613-8, 2013 WL 153848, at *9–12 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.C. Jan. 15, 2013) (also noting that while fee-only plans might be more susceptible to a finding of bad 
faith, courts continue to determine good faith on a case-by-case basis in lieu of a per se rule against fee-only 
plans). 
 25  Barnes, 2013 WL 153848, at *10 (citing Puffer, 674 F.3d at 79; In re Arlen, 461 B.R. 550 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mo. 2011)). 
 26  See supra note 17 and accompanying text; infra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 27  See infra Parts I.B.2 and II. 
 28  See infra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 29  Arlen, 461 B.R. at 555 (also noting that a fee-only plan “blurs the distinctions between [chapters 7 and 
13] and the various differences in their scope . . .” (citing In re Paley, 390 B.R. 53, 59–60 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 
2008)). 
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with a focus on fee-only plans. Empirical research can provide valuable insight 
in consumer bankruptcy.30 This Comment only provides a rough sketch of how 
courts are actually applying the good faith standard within the specific context 
of fee-only plans. While the totality of the circumstances test is subjective, the 
factors courts list offer a hook for which an empirical study can examine the 
test.  
In light of three recent circuit court decisions, this study offers insight on 
whether courts are focusing their good faith analysis in fee-only cases with any 
statistical significance. Conducting this analysis will help inform courts 
whether the traditional good faith test should be modified in the context of fee-
only plans.  
Part I provides relevant background discussion of chapter 13 and the 
evolution of its good faith standard. Part II dissects the concept of “fee-only,” 
defines its scope for purposes of this study, and discusses the three circuit court 
decisions that have definitively ruled on the validity of fee-only plans.  
Part III first discusses the empirical study’s method, assumptions and 
limitations, and the list of good faith factors. It then presents the results of the 
analysis. The study found no statistically significant relationship between the 
percentage of repayment to general unsecured creditors and a good faith 
finding. The findings, however, did reveal a few statistically significant 
relationships: (1) within the totality of the circumstances test, as the difference 
between the number of factors a court discusses and the number of factors a 
court lists increases, the likelihood that a court finds the plan to be in good 
faith decreases; (2) one factor’s listing and one other factor’s discussion are 
statistically significant predictors of a good faith finding; and (3) four pairs of 
factors are discussed in the same case at statistically significant rates. 
Part IV discusses the overall implications of the study’s results and offers 
options moving forward, including a discussion of a modified approach to fee-
only plans, which would require special circumstances to justify the plan under 
11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a)(3) and 1325(a)(7). This approach is derived from one 
possible interpretation of Puffer.31 
 
 30  See generally Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Empirical Research in Consumer Bankruptcy, 80 TEX. L. 
REV. 2123 (2002).  
 31  Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2012). See infra Part II.B.1. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
Part I.A. provides an overview and history of chapter 13, including the 
contrast between its intended purpose and how debtors actually use it. Part I.B. 
then discusses the pros and cons of chapter 13 compared to chapter 7, with 
particular attention to attorney fees and how fee-only plans challenge the 
underlying purpose of chapter 13. Part I.C. then traces the development of 
chapter 13’s good faith provisions, including courts’ listing of factors to 
consider in the totality of the circumstances test for good faith, on which this 
empirical study is based.  
A. Chapter 13 History and Purpose: The Rosy Vision 
Entitled “Adjustment of Debts of an Individual with Regular Income,” 
chapter 13 offers consumer debtors an alternative to chapter 7 liquidation.32 
While the goals of both chapters are to provide a “fresh start” for the debtor 
and to secure a fair repayment to creditors,33 each chapter’s method for 
reaching those goals is different. In chapter 7 the trustee liquidates the debtor’s 
non-exempt assets that are property of the bankruptcy estate and uses the 
proceeds to pay creditors’ claims.34 Chapter 13, however, allows a debtor to 
repay creditors with future income over a given period of time under court 
supervision.35 With the adoption of the “means test” in the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”),36 Congress 
made clear that chapter 13 should be a system where “debtors who can pay 
creditors do pay them.”37 Fee-only plans call into question whether a supposed 
 
 32  11 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1330 (2012).  
 33 See Rederford v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 589 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting that one purpose of the 
Code is to provide “evenhanded treatment” to creditors); In re Hageney, 422 B.R. 254, 259 (Bankr. E.D. 
Wash. 2009) (“[The] commencement of a bankruptcy case under any chapter of the [] Code must be consistent 
with bankruptcy policy, and with [the] goal of providing a fresh start to honest but unfortunate debtors while 
maximizing repayment to creditors.”); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 118 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5963, 6078 (stating a goal of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is to provide debtors with a fresh start). 
 34 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (listing the exemptions to property of the bankruptcy estate); id. § 541 (setting for 
the creation and contents of the bankruptcy estate); id. § 704(a)(1) (“The trustee shall—collect and reduce to 
money the property of the estate . . . .”); id. §§ 725–726 (setting forth the order in which the trustee shall 
distribute the liquidated property of the estate). 
 35 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 118. 
 36 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102(h), 119 
Stat. 23, 33–34 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)). Chapter 13 incorporates the chapter 7 means test 
for above-median-income debtors. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3). 
 37 Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 721 (2011) (describing the intent behind both 
chapter 7 and chapter 13 using the means test, which seeks to force can-pay debtors out of chapter 7 and is part 
of the repayment calculus for above-median debtors in chapter 13). 
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can-pay debtor is doing anything but “canceling and eliminating the claims of 
creditors while simply paying their attorneys.”38 
Chapter 13 under the modern Code39 replaced “Chapter XIII—Wage 
Earners’ Plans” from the Bankruptcy Act of 1938.40 Chapter 13 eliminated 
chapter XIII’s requirement that all creditors consent to the plan.41 By removing 
the consent requirement, the drafters intended to provide the debtor with more 
realistic repayment terms that took the debtor’s circumstances and ability to 
repay into consideration.42 While the “best interests of creditors” test in 
§ 1325(a)(4)—which ensures unsecured creditors do not receive less than they 
would in a hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation43—set the repayment floor, the 
legislative history indicates Congress expected chapter 13 debtors would repay 
more. The House Report noted, “Creditors will not be disadvantaged [under 
the new chapter 13], because the plan must still pay them more than they 
would get under a liquidation.”44 The Senate Report also suggests that the 
drafters did not intend for repayment under the new chapter 13 plans to equal 
merely the liquidation value.45 Nevertheless, courts wrestled with this very 
issue in early cases litigating good faith in chapter 13.46 
Congress indeed had a rosy vision of the new chapter 13 and its perceived 
benefits to debtors—namely, higher postbankruptcy credit worthiness than a 
 
 38  In re Paley, 390 B.R. 53, 59 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 39  Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 1301–1330 (2012)). 
 40 Bankruptcy Act of 1938 (Chandler Act), ch. XIII, 52 Stat. 840, 930 (repealed 1978). 
 41  H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 123. The consent requirement posed a significant barrier for debtors 
proposing a “composition plan,” one that provides less than full repayment, as creditors typically only 
consented to an “extension plan,” one that repaid debts in full. See, e.g., Richard E. Flint, Consumer 
Bankruptcy Policy: Ability to Pay and Catholic Social Teaching, 43 ST. MARY’S L.J. 333, 346–72 (2011) 
(providing a history of composition and extension plans in bankruptcy law). 
 42  H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 123–24. 
 43  11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). This provision is widely known as the “best interests of creditors test.” See, 
e.g., Susan A. Schneider, Bankruptcy Reform and Family Famers: Correcting the Disposable Income 
Problem, 38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 309, 316 (2006). 
 44  H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 124 (emphasis added). It is unclear what the House meant by this statement 
given that § 1325(a)(4) was in unaltered existence at the time of the report. Perhaps stating “more than” was in 
recognition of the test requiring chapter 13 creditors to receive a higher total dollar amount to account for the 
present value of a chapter 7 repayment. See id. at 408 (stating that the phrase, “‘[v]alue, as of the effective date 
of the plan,’ as used in . . . proposed 11 U.S.C. . . . 1325(a)(4) . . . indicates that the promised payment under 
the plan must be discounted to present value as of the effective date of the plan”). 
 45  S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 13 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5799 (“The [chapter 7 
discharge limitation] will also . . . prevent chapter 13 plans from turning into mere offers of composition plans 
under which payments would equal only the non-exempt assets of the debtor.”). 
 46  Infra Part I.C.1. 
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chapter 7 debtor, and a feeling of pride upon successful completion of the plan, 
particularly when it pays creditors in full.47 The reality, however, has been less 
rosy. Chapter 13 plans often appear on the opposite side of the repayment 
spectrum, as debtors attempt to leave general unsecured creditors empty-
handed while creatively deducting expenses such as flat-screen televisions with 
surround-sound systems48 and vacation timeshares.49 Very few plans propose 
anything close to full repayment to creditors.50 Credit advantages for chapter 
13 over chapter 7 are almost non-existent; in fact, one study even suggests that 
chapter 7 debtors have the advantage.51 And nearly two-thirds of all chapter 13 
debtors fail to complete the plan and receive a discharge.52 
B. Chapter 13 v. Chapter 7: The Tensions That Fee-Only Plans Highlight 
1. The Pros and Cons of Chapter 13 
Chapter 13 some benefits over chapter 7, and three will be discussed here. 
First, a chapter 13 debtor may retain all of his pre-bankruptcy assets—they are 
not used to satisfy creditors’ claims.53 Second, the discharge provisions in 
chapter 13 are more generous than chapter 7, but the so-called 
“superdischarge” has eroded over time with Code amendments, especially 
BAPCPA.54 Third, chapter 13 debtors may pay attorney fees over the duration 
 
 47  S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 13 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5799; H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, 
at 118 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6079. 
 48  In re Aprea, 368 B.R. 558, 567–68 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2007). 
 49  In re Klaven, No. 11-41677, 2012 WL 2930865, at *1 (Bankr. D. Mass. July 18, 2012). 
 50  See Scott F. Norberg & Andrew J. Velkey, Debtor Discharge and Creditor Repayment in Chapter 13, 
39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 473, 477 (2006) (finding that, in a study of seven districts, “nearly 45% of the cases in 
which a proposed repayment was reported proposed to pay no more than 25%”). 
 51  See Katherine Porter, Bankrupt Profits: The Credit Industry’s Business Model for Postbankruptcy 
Lending, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1369, 1408–10 (2007). Porter’s study found that chapter 7 debtors are significantly 
more likely than chapter 13 debtors to receive credit offers, particularly secured credit, after filing bankruptcy. 
Id. Porter notes, “[o]verall, lenders exhibit a customer preference for [c]hapter 7 filers over [c]hapter 13 
filers . . . . Despite [the lending industry’s] rhetoric championing [c]hapter 13 as the ‘honorable’ path for 
families in serious financial trouble . . . .” Id. at 1410–11. Also, both chapter 7 and chapter 13 filings may stay 
on a debtor’s credit report for the same amount of time. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1). 
 52 John Eggum, Katherine Porter & Tara Twomey, Saving Homes in Bankruptcy: Housing Affordability 
and Loan Modification, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1123, 1144 & n.80 (citing three studies from 1989, 2001, and 
2006, all of which found that approximately one-third or less of chapter 13 filings result in plan completion 
and discharge). 
 53  H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 118. 
 54  See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 314(b), 
199 Stat. 23, 88 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1328) (amending § 1328(a) to expand the list of non-
dischargeable debts in chapter 13); In re Platt, No. 12-6170-13, 2012 WL 5842899, at *2 n.4 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 
Nov. 19, 2012) (summarizing BAPCPA’s effect on the “super discharge”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 
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of the plan, as opposed to paying the fees upon filing in chapter 7.55 Whether 
up-front payment for a chapter 7 filing is impossible or merely less desirable, 
deferring fee payments can be a powerful motivator for a debtor to choose 
chapter 13 over chapter 7.56 Although debtors always have the option to 
proceed pro se, studies show that debtors with legal representation tend to have 
a much higher success rate in bankruptcy proceedings than pro se filers.57 
Despite the benefits, chapter 13 also has its costs, two of which will be 
discussed here. First, whereas chapter 7 debtors benefit from a swift discharge, 
which typically occurs within a few months of filing a petition,58 chapter 13 
debtors remain under court supervision for the entire duration of the plan, 
typically three to five years.59 It is only after the trustee receives the last 
 
76–77 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 144 (outlining BAPCPA’s amendments to non-
dischargeable debts in § 1328(a)); Larry A. Pittman II & Jeffrey A. Deines, A Hitchhiker’s Guide to Consumer 
Bankruptcy Reform, J. KAN. B.A., Nov./Dec. 2006, at 20, 22 (describing how BAPCPA virtually eliminated 
the chapter 13 “super discharge”). 
 55  See infra note 202. 
 56  See Jean Braucher, A Guide to Interpretation of the 2005 Bankruptcy Law, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 349, 380 & n.174 (2008) (noting that “for chapter 13 debtors at or below median income and probably 
for nearly all chapter 13 debtors, what drives them into chapter 13 is not failing the presumed abuse means 
test, but . . . such considerations as . . . paying attorneys fees over time . . .”) (emphasis added); cf. Lois R. 
Lupica, The Consumer Bankruptcy Fee Study: Final Report, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 17, 47, 49 n.120 
(2012) (noting that in chapter 7 no-asset cases—which are a vast majority of chapter 7 filings according to 
Table 2 at page 47—attorneys rarely agree to accept a portion of their fee after filing the petition). But see 
generally David E. Frisvold & Sharron B. Lane, Attorney’s Fees in Chapter 13: Do They Influence Chapter 
Choice?, 2003 No. 9 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER 1 (finding no statistically significant relationship between 
the amount of attorney’s fees and the percentage of chapter 13 filings, as between chapter 7 and chapter 13, 
and concluding the fees may not be the source of influence in chapter selection as some have suggested). 
 57  See Lupica, supra note 56, at 81 (“Post-BAPCPA, 100% of [pro se] cases were filed under chapter 13 
with a petition preparer’s assistance. Not one of the post-BAPCPA cases filed with the assistance of a petition 
preparer ended in the debtor receiving a discharge.”); Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical Examination of Access to 
Chapter 7 Relief by Pro Se Debtors, 26 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 5, 22–23 (2009) (in a sample of over 85,000 
chapter 7 cases, finding that the dismissal rate for pro se debtors was 6.4%, compared to only 0.9% of 
represented debtors). 
 58  Amy Y. Landry & Robert J. Landry, III, Medical Bankruptcy Reform: A Fallacy of Composition, 19 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 151, 166 nn.91 & 93 (2011); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(c), 4007(c) (2012) 
(setting time limits for objections to discharge in chapter 7 cases, and providing upon expiration of these 
limits, “the court shall forthwith grant the discharge”). 
 59  11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4). The required plan duration, or “applicable commitment period,” is either three 
years or not less than five years, depending on the debtor’s income. Id. § 1325(b)(4)(A). But the period may be 
shorter “if the plan provides for payment in full of all allowed unsecured claims over a shorter period.” Id. 
§ 1325(b)(4)(B). See also, e.g., Arlen, 461 B.R. at 555 (“Instead of getting their discharges within four to six 
months as they would in a no asset [c]hapter 7 proceeding, these debtors would not get a discharge, even under 
the design of the original plans, for approximately one and one-half years. And, of course, that discharge is 
less comprehensive than in [c]hapter 7.”). 
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payment due under the plan that the debtor receives a discharge.60 With 
unforeseen future events, such as fluctuations in future income, chapter 13 
debtors may default on plan payments—and indeed nearly two-thirds of them 
do61—and thus not receive a discharge, a risk that chapter 7 debtors never 
face.62 
Second, attorney fees in chapter 13 are usually significantly higher than in 
chapter 7,63 especially after the passage of BAPCPA.64 In some circumstances, 
using chapter 13 to defer fee payments, despite having the option to liquidate 
in chapter 7 and receive a much quicker discharge, might be the more 
responsible choice for debtors.65 Nevertheless, attorneys have an incentive to 
generate business by funneling debtors into chapter 13 who would otherwise 
not be in the bankruptcy system due to reluctance or inability to file for chapter 
7.66 Even if they have the ability to use either chapter, debtors often lack 
sufficient information to make an informed decision between chapters 7 and 13 
 
 60  Id. § 1328(a). 
 61  Supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 62  Positive fluctuations in income also have a detrimental effect. Chapter 13 debtors are under the 
supervision of the court for the duration of the plan, and at any time the trustee or an unsecured creditor may 
move to modify the plan payments to capture any increase in the debtor’s income. Id. § 1329(a). 
 63  Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
501, 581 (1993) (“Some local officials set standard attorneys’ fees for chapter 13 much higher than the local 
median fee for chapter 7.”); see also, e.g., In re Arlen 461 B.R. 550, 554 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2011) (“It is 
difficult to understand how a [c]hapter 13 plan under these circumstances benefits anyone other than counsel. 
The fees charged by counsel in this case are approximately twice what would be charged for [c]hapter 7 
proceedings for these [d]ebtors.”). 
 64  Lupica, supra note 56, at 56–57, 69. As reflected below, the fee study compared chapter 7 and chapter 
13 mean attorney fees before and after BAPCPA. Note that a chapter 7 “no-asset case” occurs when, based on 
the schedules, “the debtor has no non-exempt assets for liquidation . . . .” In re Venegas, 257 B.R. 41, 44 
(Bankr. D. Idaho 2001). The findings were as follows: 
 
Mean Attorney Fee (per case) 









Pre-BAPCPA $1,262 $1,491 $654 $821 
Post-BAPCPA $2,061 $2,564 $968 $1,072 
 
Lupica, supra note 56, at 57, 69”). 
 65  See, e.g., Crager, 691 F.3d at 674 (involving a debtor who had not yet defaulted on debt payments and 
chose chapter 13 over chapter 7 because “it would have taken her over a year to save enough money to pay the 
[upfront] costs for a [c]hapter 7 bankruptcy and to do so she would have needed to stop making her minimum 
monthly credit card payments”). 
 66  See Braucher, supra note 63, at 580–81 (studying attorney culture and noting from one city that “high-
volume lawyers are much more willing to use chapter 13, primarily for financial reasons, while the low-
volume lawyers think that chapter 13 is a bad deal for clients”).  
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and are vulnerable to self-serving advice from their attorney.67 In a close 
decision, an attorney motivated by the promise of higher attorney fees may 
counsel more debtors into chapter 13,68 despite delaying the debtor’s discharge 
for years, raising the likelihood of default, and increasing the burden on the 
court system.69 
2. The Tension: Does “Can Pay” = “Can Pay Fees”? 
In fairness to attorneys, a comparison of fees between chapters ought to 
account for the time value of money by comparing chapter 7 fees paid in 
today’s dollars with chapter 13 fees paid over time, discounted to present 
value. Arguably, the higher fee rate in chapter 13 compensates the attorney for 
this—that is, the debtor is essentially financing, not deferring, payment to the 
attorney. And given the high rate of default on chapter 13 plans, arguably these 
fees ought to earn a significant risk rate.70 For debtors who simply cannot 
afford to pay for chapter 7 up front, perhaps this arrangement gives debtors 
access to the bankruptcy system while fairly compensating the attorney for the 
risk of nonpayment. 
But financing attorney fees is not the purpose of chapter 13.71 Should 
debtors be allowed to access chapter 13 when they are merely financing 
attorney fees and deferring other mandatory costs, and doing nothing else that 
could not be done in chapter 7?72 Are these debtors truly “can pay” debtors?73 
Shouldn’t such a debtor, as one U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has suggested, 
 
 67  Braucher, supra note 63, at 581. 
 68  David S. Kennedy, Vanessa A. Lantin & Brent Heilig, Attorney Compensation in Chapter 13 Cases 
and Related Matters, 13 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC., no. 6, 2004 (citing Jean Braucher, Increasing Uniformity in 
Consumer Bankruptcy: Means Testing as a Distraction and the National Bankruptcy Review Commission's 
Proposal as a Starting Point, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 21 (1998); Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren 
& Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the 
Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 801, 844 (1994)) (“Do larger fees for debtors' 
attorneys in chapter 13 cases influence the choice of that chapter over chapter 7? It has been suggested that it 
does. Are larger fees for debtors' attorneys in chapter 13 cases a carrot or incentive for some attorneys to 
inappropriately encourage clients to file cases under chapter 13 instead of chapter 7 cases? It has been 
suggested that they are.”). 
 69 See Scott F. Norberg, Consumer Bankruptcy’s New Clothes: An Empirical Study of Discharge and 
Debt Collection in Chapter 13, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 415, 437 & n.71 (1999); supra notes 52, 58–62 
and accompanying text. 
 70  See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 71  See Brown v. Gore (In re Brown), 742 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 72  See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 73  See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
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proceed pro se instead74—either in chapter 7 or chapter 13? For example, in 
chapter 13, proceeding pro se, the debtor could provide some repayment to 
unsecured creditors with money that otherwise would have gone to the 
attorney. Or suppose the debtor took one bankruptcy judge’s, advice 
mentioned at the beginning of this comment: save the money that would 
otherwise be used for chapter 13 plan payments; wait a few months; and pay 
an attorney for a chapter 7 filing.75  
There are two worthy counter-arguments: recall that 1) pro se debtors are 
less successful in bankruptcy than represented debtors,76 and 2) under 
§ 1325(a)(4) the Code does not actually require a chapter 13 debtor to repay 
unsecured creditors any more than they would have received in chapter 7.77  
This is the tension that a fee-only plan highlights. Debtors are using chapter 
13 to do what the Code seems to implicitly authorize under § 1325(a)(4), read 
together the provisions granting attorney fees priority status: finance the full 
amount of attorney fees and pay little or nothing to general unsecured 
creditors.78 Put another way, debtors are using chapter 13 to finance the full 
amount of attorney fees and doing exactly what they could have done in 
chapter 7. Yet courts seem to agree that fee-only plans do not pass the smell 
test, at least not often.79 And the basic smell test for chapter 13 is whether the 
plan is proposed and filed in good faith.80 The next section traces the 
development of the good faith test.  
 
 74  Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2012) (“There is no showing, however, 
that the debtor had a pressing need for the [attorney’s] services, . . . that it was infeasible to proceed pro se.”). 
 75 Brown, 742 at 1312; supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text. 
 76 Supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 77  Supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 78  Attorney fees are a priority administrative expense claim that must be paid in order to receive a 
discharge. See infra note 202 and accompanying text. Thus, under these provisions and § 1325(a)(4), a debtor 
must pay his attorney but does not necessarily have to repay unsecured creditors anything.  
 79  See, e.g., In re Barnes, No. 12-06613-8, 2013 WL 153848, at *1–2 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Jan. 15, 2013) 
(citing In re Buck, 432 B.R. 13, 22 n.14 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010)) (noting that a vast majority of courts find fee-
only plans to be in bad faith); In re Hopper, 474 B.R. 872, 886 n.27 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2012). 
 80  11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3), (7) (2012).  
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C. Chapter 13 Good Faith Analysis: The Development of the Totality of the 
Circumstances Test 
The concept of good faith is integral to both consumer and business 
bankruptcies and is a mandatory requirement for plan confirmation.81 Congress 
never defined the term, presumably in deference to judicial discretion.82 Courts 
often turn to Collier’s definition of good faith, which states, “[a] 
comprehensive definition of good faith is not practical. Broadly speaking, the 
basic inquiry should be whether or not under the circumstances of the case 
there has been an abuse of the provisions, purpose, or spirit of [the Chapter] in 
the proposal of the plan.”83 As discussed in the remainder of this Part, courts 
began applying this broad concept on a case-by-case basis and developed non-
exhaustive lists of factors to consider. 
1. Pre-1984 Case Law 
Prior to the 1984 amendments to the Code,84 cases challenging chapter 13 
plans for lack of good faith largely turned on the amount of disposable income 
the debtor proposed to pay in the plan, as well as the repayment to general 
unsecured creditors.85 Some courts held chapter 13 plans required a 
“substantial” or “meaningful” repayment to unsecured creditors, above what 
§ 1325(a)(4) would require.86 One court relied on legislative history to 
 
 81 Id. §§ 1129(b)(3); 1325(a)(3), (7).; In re Gonzales, 172 B.E. 320, 325 (E.D. Wash. 1994) (citing In re 
Chinichian, 784 F.2d 1440, 1442–44 (9th Cir.1986)). 
 82  See Goeb v. Heid (In re Goeb), 675 F.2d 1386, 1389–90 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting that “courts are 
impeded not only by [“good faith”] being an ambiguous term that resists precise definition in any case, but 
also by the lack of authoritative guidance on its meaning in § 1325(a)(3),” and indicating that as a court of 
equity, bankruptcy judges have discretion to determine what good faith requires in each case (citing Am. 
United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, Fla., 311 U.S. 138, 145 (1940))); In re Mathis, No. 12-05618-
8, 2013 WL 153833, at *9 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Jan. 15, 2013) (noting Congress’s silence on defining “good 
faith” in the chapter 13 statute); In re Buck, 432 B.R. 13, 19–20 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010) (citing Keach v. 
Boyajian (In re Keach), 243 B.R. 851, 856 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000) (noting the lack of a definition, courts’ 
varying approaches to interpretation, and that “Congress presumably used the phrase ‘good faith’ in its 
ordinary sense”)), vacated sub nom. Buck v. Pappalardo (In re Buck), No. 08-43918, 2014 WL 1347216 (D. 
Mass. April 2, 2014). 
 83  See, e.g., United States v. Estus (In re Estus), 695 F.2d 311, 316 (8th Cir. 1982) (citing Deans v. 
O’Donnell (In re Deans), 692 F.2d 968, 972 (4th Cir. 1982) (quoting 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 9.10 at 319 
(14th ed. 1978))). 
 84  Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333. 
 85  See Brian G. Smooke, Comment, Section 1325(b) and Zero Payment Plans in Chapter 13, 4 BANKR. 
DEV. J. 449, 450–54 (1987) (discussing key case law in pre-1984 good faith litigation). 
 86  See Estus, 695 F.2d at 314; In re Hurd, 4 B.R. 551, 556 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1980); In re Iacovoni, 2 
B.R. 256, 268 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980).  
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conclude that § 1325(a)(4) merely sets a floor, from which the good faith 
standard can be used as a tool to “[e]nsure reasonable offers of repayment.”87 
Other courts dissented from this view and held that § 1325(a)(4) was the sole 
standard for how much unsecured creditors should be repaid.88 These courts 
reasoned good faith only requires “honesty of intention”89 and that plans would 
fail the good faith standard under § 1325(a)(3) “only in those unusual cases in 
which there has been an abuse of the provisions, purposes, or spirit of [c]hapter 
13.”90  
Eventually, the circuit courts generally agreed that while the amount of 
repayment to unsecured creditors is one of many considerations weighing on 
the good faith of a chapter 13 plan,91 good faith should be analyzed on a case-
by-case basis, considering the totality of the debtor’s circumstances.92 
Concurrently, what specific circumstances a court should consider in each 
case also came into focus. In Ga. R.R. Bank & Trust Co. v. Kull (In re Kull), 
the Southern District of Georgia made an early attempt to develop a list of such 
factors.93 The Fourth Circuit was the first circuit court to offer a list of factors 
 
 87  Iacovoni, 2 B.R. at 266–67 (noting the legislative intent of § 1325(a)(4) requiring “not less than,” 
rather than “more than,” was to prevent overpayment where the debtor could liquidate and repay 100 percent 
of the unsecured creditors’ claims, as well as “to impose a firm minimum upon which a flexible ‘good faith’ 
requirement for additional payments could be based”). 
 88  Barnes v. Whelan (In re Barnes), 689 F.2d 193, 198–200 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Estus, 695 F.2d at 314–15; 
see also Smooke, supra note 85, at 452–54 (discussing In re Sadler, 3 B.R. 536, 536–37 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 
1980)). 
 89  Barnes, 689 F.2d at 200. 
 90  In re Barnes, 13 B.R. 997, 999 (D.D.C. 1981) (quoting In re Cloutier, 3 B.R. 584, 584 (Bankr. D. 
Colo. 1980)). 
 91  Estus, 695 F.2d at 315–16 (providing a synopsis of good faith standard development in the federal 
circuits); Smooke, supra note 85, at 452–54 (citing as the foundation for this theory Deans v. O’Donnell (In re 
Deans), 692 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1982), which involved a plan where the debtor proposed to payment of a vast 
majority of her disposable income but nevertheless resulted in no payments to general unsecured creditors). 
 92  Estus, 695 F.2d at 315–16 (citing Deans, 692 F.2d 968; Ravenot v. Rimgale (In re Rimgale), 669 F.2d 
426 (7th Cir. 1982); Goeb v. Heid (In re Goeb), 675 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1982); Barnes, 689 F.2d 193). 
 93  Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co. v. Kull (In re Kull), 12 B.R. 654, 659 (S.D. Ga. 1981) (listing: “(a) 
[T]he amount of income of the debtor and the debtor’s spouse from all sources; (b) the regular and recurring 
living expenses for the debtor and his dependents; (c) the amount of the attorney’s fees to be awarded in the 
case and paid by the debtor; (d) the probable or expected duration of the [c]hapter 13 plan; (e) the motivations 
of the debtor and his sincerity in seeking relief under the provisions of [c]hapter 13; (f) the ability of the debtor 
to earn and the likelihood of future increase or diminution of earnings; (g) special situations such as inordinate 
medical expense, or unusual care required for any member of the debtor’s family; (h) the frequency with 
which the debtor has sought relief under any section or title of the Bankruptcy Reform Act or its predecessor’s 
statutes; (i) the circumstances under which the debtor has contracted his debts and his demonstrated bona fides, 
or lack of same, in dealing with his creditors; (j) whether the amount or percentage of payment offered by the 
particular debtor would operate or be a mockery of honest, hard-working, well-intended debtors who pay a 
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in Deans v. O’Donnell (In re Deans),94 followed by the Eighth Circuit a few 
months later in United States v. Estus (In re Estus).95 In Estus the court 
developed an eleven-factor list, based in part on the Deans and lower court 
decisions, including Kull: 
(1) [T]he amount of the proposed payments and the amount of the 
debtor’s surplus; (2) the debtor’s employment history, ability to earn 
and likelihood of future increases in income; (3) the probable or 
expected duration of the plan; (4) the accuracy of the plan’s 
statements of the debts, expenses and percentage repayment of 
unsecured debt and whether any inaccuracies are an attempt to 
mislead the court; (5) the extent of preferential treatment between 
classes of creditors; (6) the extent to which secured claims are 
modified; (7) the type of debt sought to be discharged and whether 
any such debt is nondischargeable in [c]hapter 7; (8) the existence of 
special circumstances such as inordinate medical expenses; (9) the 
frequency with which the debtor has sought relief under the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act; (10) the motivation and sincerity of the 
debtor in seeking [c]hapter 13 relief; and (11) the burden which the 
plan’s administration would place upon the trustee.96 
In adopting a variation of Kull and Estus, the Eleventh Circuit noted that all 
circuit courts agreed the amount of repayment to unsecured creditors was also 
a factor, even though it was not on the enumerated list.97 
Today, all but two of the federal circuit courts have expressly adopted the 
“totality of the circumstances” test as their standard.98 While not specifically 
addressing the issue, the Supreme Court implicitly approved the test by citing 
 
higher percentage of their claims consistent with the purpose and spirit of [c]hapter 13; (k) the burden which 
the administration of the plan would place on the trustee; and (l) the salutary rehabilitative provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 which are to be construed liberally in favor of the debtor.”). 
 94  Deans, 692 F.2d at 972 (“[N]ot only the percentage of proposed repayment, but also the debtor’s 
financial situation, the period of time payment will be made, the debtor’s employment history and prospects, 
the nature and amount of unsecured claims, the debtor’s past bankruptcy filings, the debtor’s honesty in 
representing facts, and any unusual or exceptional problems facing the particular debtor.”). 
 95  Estus, 695 F.2d at 317. 
 96  Id. (citing Deans, 692 F.2d at 972; Kull, 12 B.R. at 659; In re Heard, 6 B.R. 876, 882 (Bankr. W.D. 
Ky. 1980); In re Iacovoni, 2 B.R. 256, 267 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980)). 
 97  Kitchens v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co. (In re Kitchens), 702 F.2d 885, 889 (11th Cir. 1983). 
 98 See Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2012); Brandon L. Johnson, 
Comment, Good Faith and Disposable Income: Should the Good Faith Inquiry Evaluate the Proposed Amount 
of Repayment?, 36 GONZ. L. REV. 375, 379 & n.26 (2001) (noting that the “totality of the circumstances” 
approach is used in the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits). 
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lower court cases that applied it.99 The two federal circuits that have not 
expressly adopted the test—the Second Circuit and the District of Columbia 
Circuit—have used a subjective, case-by-case determination and cited other 
circuit precedent approvingly.100 All of the lower courts in both circuits have 
also adopted the test, either expressly101 or implicitly.102 
Courts uniformly agree that—like many fact-intensive, subjective standards 
in the law—any list of factors is not exhaustive of all the relevant 
considerations.103 But these lists have become guideposts and drive a 
substantial portion of the good-faith inquiry in chapter 13.104 
 
 99  Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 522–23 (2010) (citing In re Myers, 491 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 
2007); Neufeld v. Freeman, 794 F.2d 149, 153 (4th Cir. 1986); In re Glenn, 288 B.R. 516, 520 (Bankr. E.D. 
Tenn. 2002)).  
 100  See Johnson v. Vanguard Holding Corp. (In re Johnson), 708 F.2d 865, 868 (2d Cir. 1983) (citations 
omitted) (holding that the good faith standard requires the debtor’s honesty, and focuses on his “conduct in the 
submission, approval, and implementation of a [c]hapter 13 bankruptcy plan”); Barnes v. Whelan (In re 
Barnes), 689 F.2d 193, 198–200 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (finding good faith requires an “honesty of intention”); Goeb 
v. Heid (In re Goeb), 675 F.2d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that “whether the debtor has 
misrepresented facts in his plan, unfairly manipulated the [Code], or otherwise proposed his [c]hapter 13 plan 
in an inequitable manner”). 
 101  See Tennessee Commerce Bank v. Hutchins, 409 B.R. 680, 683 (D. Vt. 2009); Plagakis v. Gelberg (In 
re Plagakis), No. 03-CV-0728, 2004 WL 203090, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2004); Connelly v. Bath Nat’l 
Bank, No. 93-CV-6449, 1995 WL 822677, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 1995); In re Paley, 390 B.R. 53, 57–58 
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2008); Finizie v. City of Bridgeport (In re Finizie), 184 B.R. 415, 419 (Bankr. D. Conn. 
1995).  
 102  In re Yavarkovsky, 23 B.R. 756, 759 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding a similar, if not largely the same, 
standard for good faith that “contemplates a broad judicial inquiry into the conduct and state of mind of the 
debtor” and considers “all aspects of fair dealing . . . the lawfulness of the debtor’s conduct . . . good faith in 
dealing with creditors and their claims”); In re Allen, 300 B.R. 105, 123 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2003). 
 103 See Brown v. Gore (In re Brown), 742 F.3d 1309, 1316 (11th Cir. 2014); Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re 
Puffer), 674 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2012) (“The totality of the circumstances test cannot be reduced to a 
mechanical checklist, and we do not endeavor here to canvass the field and catalogue the factors that must be 
weighed when [when ruling on good faith].”); In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350, 1357 (7th Cir. 1992); United States 
v. Estus (In re Estus), 695 F.2d 311, 317 (8th Cir. 1982) (“We make no attempt to enumerate all relevant 
considerations since the factors and the weight they are to be given will vary with the facts and circumstances 
of the case.”); In re Dicey, 312 B.R. 456, 459 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2004) (“No one factor is determinative, but it is 
the totality of all the various factors and the facts of the particular case that is considered.”). See generally 
Elbein, supra note 12. 
 104 See generally Elbein, supra note 12, at 453–54; Ellen M. Horn, Good Faith and Chapter 13 
Discharge: How Much Discretion Is Too Much?, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 657, 667–69 (1990). 
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2. 1984, Disposable Income, and Ability to Pay 
With the passage of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship 
Act (“BAFJA”) of 1984, Congress added § 1325(b) to the Code.105 In its 
original form, § 1325(b)(1) provided that upon objection by the trustee or an 
unsecured claim holder, the court may only approve the plan if the debtor 
either repays 100% of the objecting unsecured creditor’s claim or commits to 
the plan his entire “projected disposable income to be received” during the 
plan’s duration.106 Section 1325(b)(2) sets forth the statutory measure of what 
constitutes “disposable income” under the “ability to pay” test in 
§ 1325(b)(1)(B).107 
While the ability to pay test effectively ended good faith litigation over the 
amount of disposable income a debtor proposed to pay into the plan, the new 
test raised scholarly debate over whether it swallowed up the entire good faith 
inquiry, except where the debtor was clearly fraudulent or misrepresented the 
facts.108 Section 1325(b) appeared to eliminate the disposable income payment 
ratio in good faith analysis, and courts wrestled with whether the amount of 
repayment to unsecured creditors was now an issue of § 1325(b), § 1325(a)(3), 
or both.109 For example, the Seventh Circuit held that a chapter 13 plan 
“otherwise confirmable will be confirmed even if it provides for minimal (or 
no) payments if those payments meet the [§ 1325(b)] ‘ability to pay’ test.”110 
3. BAPCPA 
With the passage of BAPCPA, Congress amended § 1325(b)(1)(B) to make 
a plan confirmable if the debtor commits all projected disposable income 
received during the plan period “to make payments to unsecured creditors 
 
 105  Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 317, 98 Stat. 333, 
356 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (2012)). 
 106  Id. 
 107  Id.  
 108  Compare In re McGehan 495 B.R. 37, 43 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2013) (noting that “enactment of the ability 
to pay test in § 1325(b)(1) narrowed the good faith analysis, subsuming most of the [factors set forth by early 
Tenth Circuit precedent]”), with Richard S. Bell, The Effect of the Disposable Income Test of Section 
1325(b)(1)(B) upon the Good Faith Inquiry of Section 1325(a)(3), 5 BANKR. DEV. J. 267, 267–71 (1988) 
(arguing that the disposable income test did not significantly alter the good faith totality of the circumstances 
standard in response to Raymond T. Nimmer, Consumer Bankruptcy Abuse, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 
(1987), which argued the opposite).  
 109  See Smooke, supra note 85, at 465–74 (reviewing case law reaching each of these three conclusions). 
 110  In re Smith, 848 F.2d 813, 820 (7th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). 
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under the plan.”111 This amendment supported the view that the percentage of 
repayment to general unsecured creditors was not an issue of good faith. 
Congress also added § 1325(a)(7), a mandatory requirement for plan 
confirmation that “the action of the debtor in filing the petition was in good 
faith.”112 Whereas § 1325(a)(3) requires good faith in proposing the plan, this 
new provision sought to eliminate confusion amongst courts as to whether 
§ 1325(a)(3) applies only to proposing the plan or also extends to filing the 
petition.113 Now, litigants often challenge good faith under both provisions, 
and courts’ analysis of the provisions is indistinguishable.114 
II. “FEE-ONLY” 
A. Defining the Term for Analysis 
For practicality and simplicity, this Comment defines and uses the term 
“fee-only” to mean any chapter 13 plan that proposes to pay the debtor’s 
attorney fees and other mandatory administrative costs, while repaying 2% or 
less of the total amount of prepetition claims to general unsecured creditors.115 
Drawing the line at 2% or less mirrors the range repayment occurring in a vast 
majority of the cases that refer to the plan as “fee-only,” or some related term. 
This Comment will also discuss other cases in the study’s data set, which 
include general unsecured repayment as high as 10%, as “low percentage.”  
 
 111  11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 112  Id. § 1325(a)(7) (emphasis added). 
 113  Compare In re Ford, 78 B.R. 729, 733 & n.1 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (quoting In re Flick, 14 B.R. 912, 
916 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981)) (noting “there is no requirement that the petition be filed in good faith . . . only a 
requirement that the plan be proposed in good faith”) (internal quotation marks omitted), with Smith, 848 F.2d 
at 820 (citations omitted) (holding that the court must assess, using the same analysis, the good faith standard 
in filing the plan and petition). 
 114  See Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2012); Sikes v. Crager (In re Crager), 
691 F.3d 671 (5th Cir. 2012); see also In re Yarborough, No. 12-30549, 2012 WL 4434053, at *4 n.5 (Bankr. 
E.D. Tenn. Sept. 24, 2012) (citing In re Hall, 346 B.R. 420, 426 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2006)) (noting that “good 
faith standards under § 1325(a)(3) and (a)(7) are almost identical to those involving good faith and dismissal 
under § 1307(c)”). 
 115  The repayment amount refers to the pro rata rate. Suppose a debtor’s chapter 13 plan proposes she pay 
her two general unsecured creditors (“creditor 1” and “creditor 2”) $300 over the life of the plan. If creditor 1 
has an allowed claim of $5,000, and creditor 2 has an allowed claim of $10,000, then the total general 
unsecured debt is $15,000. The $300 payment represents 2% of the total general unsecured debt. Thus, each 
creditor would receive a pro rata payment of 2% of its allowed claim. The result is creditor 1 receives $100, 
and creditor 2 receives $200.  
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“Fee-only” is an informal term;116 other phrasings for the concept include 
“zero payment,”117 “attorney fee-only,”118 “de minimis,”119 and “attorney-fee-
centric.”120 While no precise definition exists, these terms generally refer to 
chapter 13 plans that propose either zero or nominal repayments to general 
unsecured creditors, though the plans may nevertheless pay secured and 
priority unsecured claims.121 Trustees have even challenged the reasonableness 
of attorney fee awards under the good faith standard specifically when the plan 
proposes to pay almost the entire amount of repayments to the debtor 
attorney’s fees, thereby rendering the fee award unreasonable.122 Some fee-
only plans do exactly that: pay only the mandatory administrative expense 
claims, including attorney and trustee fees.123 These plans do not pay secured 
or priority debts through the plan, and also propose to discharge 100% of the 
general unsecured debt.124 
Two interesting subsets of cases have arisen that are worth noting: 1) plans 
with “early termination language,” which almost always leave unsecured 
creditors with no repayment125; and 2) “attorney-fee-centric” plans, which 
 
 116  See, e.g., Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78, 80 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting it is 
“colloquially known as a ‘fee-only’ plan”). 
 117  See Smooke, supra note 85, at 450–54. 
 118  See In re Buck, 32 B.R. 13, 18, & n.7 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010), vacated sub nom. Buck v. Pappalardo 
(In re Buck), No. 08-43918, 2014 WL 1347216 (D. Mass. April 2, 2014). 
 119  See Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co. v. Kull (In re Kull), 12 B.R. 654, 658 (S.D. Ga. 1981). 
 120  Brown v. Gore (In re Brown), 742 F.3d 1309, 1314 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 121  See, e.g., Puffer, 674 F.3d at 80–81 (describing fee-only plans as those that leave “the general 
[unsecured] creditors holding an empty (or nearly empty) bag”) (emphasis added). Compare id. at 80 
(involving a plan payment of “$300 (or about 2% of the roughly $15,000 owed by the debtor)”), and Buck, 432 
B.R. at 18 n.7 (noting the “Attorney Fee-Only” plan actually “provided a [de minimis] dividend to unsecured 
creditors”), with Deans v. O’Donnell (In re Deans), 692 F.2d 968, 969 (4th Cir. 1982) (involving plan where 
general unsecured creditors received nothing). 
 122  See Sikes v. Crager (In re Crager), 691 F.3d 671, 675 (5th Cir. 2012) (involving a trustee challenge 
that the bankruptcy court erroneously awarded debtor’s attorney a fee amounting to “almost the entire amount 
paid to the Trustee”). One court even used the term “fee-only” to refer to two chapter 13 plans proposing 
general unsecured creditor repayments of 16% and 18%. In re Jackson, No. 11-42528-13, 2012 WL 909782, at 
*1–2, 4–7 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Mar. 16, 2012), aff’d sub nom. Brown v. Gore (In re Brown), 742 F.3d 1309, 
1316 (11th Cir. 2014). Fee-only analysis may have been used because the court concluded the debtors’ 
primary motivation for using chapter 13 instead of chapter 7 was to finance their attorneys’ fees over time. 
Also, at least one of the plans would not begin funding unsecured creditors until almost halfway through the 
duration of the plan. Id. at *1–2.  
 123  See Ingram v. Burchard, 482 B.R. 313, 316–17 (N.D. Cal. 2012); In re Molina, 420 B.R. 825, 826 
(Bankr. D.N.M. 2009). 
 124  See, e.g., Ingram, 482 B.R. at 316; In re Molina, 420 B.R. at 826. 
 125  In re Barnes, No. 12-06613-8, 2013 WL 153848, at *1–2 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Jan. 15, 2013). 
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front-load attorney fees in the monthly plan payments and do not begin 
repayment to unsecured creditors until the final months of the plan.126 
1. Early Termination Language 
Early termination language allows the debtor, with the trustee’s consent, to 
cease payments and receive a discharge as soon as the plan satisfies all 
mandatory requirements—including attorney fees as a priority administrative 
expense—even though this occurs before the end of the applicable 
commitment period.127 Because chapter 13 requires debtors to pay all projected 
disposable income to general unsecured creditors for the applicable 
commitment period, early termination benefits debtors with zero or negative 
projected disposable income.128 Early termination language prevents general 
unsecured creditors from receiving the full benefit of applicable commitment 
period for repayment.  
Recently, the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina 
disposed of three cases, all involving similar facts, where each plan contained 
early termination language.129 Each of the chapter 13 debtors listed zero or 
negative projected disposable income.130 The applicable commitment period 
was 36 months for two of the plans and 60 months for the third.131 The early 
termination language however allowed payments to cease after 23, 32, and 36 
 
 126  Brown, 742 F.3d at 1311, 1314. 
 127  Barnes, 2013 WL 153848, at *1–2. The early termination language in that case was as follows: 
This [c]hapter 13 [p]lan will be deemed complete and shall cease and a discharge shall be 
entered, upon payment to the Trustee of a sum sufficient to pay in full: (A) [a]llowed 
administrative priority claims, including specifically the Trustee’s commissions and attorneys’ 
fees and expenses ordered by the Court to be paid to the Debtor’s Attorney, (B) allowed secured 
claims (including but not limited to arrearage claims), excepting those which are scheduled to be 
paid directly by the Debtor “outside” the plan, (C) [a]llowed unsecured priority claims, (D) 
[c]osign protect consumer debt claims (only where the Debtor proposes such treatment), (E) 
[postpetition] claims allowed under 11 U.S.C. § 1305, (F) [t]he dividend, if any, required to be 
paid to non-priority general unsecured creditors (not including priority unsecured creditors) 
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B), and (G) [a]ny extra amount necessary to satisfy the 
“liquidation test” as set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). 
Id. 
 128  See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (2012). 
 129  Barnes, 2013 WL 153848; In re Mathis, No. 12-05618-8, 2013 WL 153833 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Jan. 15, 
2013); In re Tedder, No. 12-06232-8, 2013 WL 145416 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Jan. 14, 2013). 
 130  Barnes, 2013 WL 153848, at *1; Mathis, 2013 WL 153833, at *1; Tedder, 2013 WL 145416, at *1. 
 131 Barnes, 2013 WL 153848, at *1; Mathis, 2013 WL 153833, at *1; Tedder, 2013 WL 145416, at *1. 
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months, respectively, and repay nothing to general unsecured creditors.132 
Without the early termination language, and assuming the debtor completed 
payments through the applicable commitment period, general unsecured 
creditors would have received repayments of 5.2%, 2.1%, and 6.5%, 
respectively.133 Using nearly identical analysis in all three cases, the court 
suggested the plans would not satisfy the good faith standard as proposed.134 
The court held the early termination language in each plan was void and 
ordered the trustees to file a confirmation motion on the plans without early 
termination.135 The court found the resulting minimal repayment to unsecured 
creditors were sufficient to satisfy the good faith standard because the 
“attorney[s] will not be the only recipient of plan dividends.”136 
2. Attorney-Fee-Centric Plans 
Attorney-fee-centric plans structure the plan payments such that the 
attorney gets paid first; the facts of Brown v. Gore (In re Brown), 137 discussed 
in more detail later in this Comment,138 are illustrative. In Brown the plan 
proposed to make monthly payments of $150 (the debtor’s monthly projected 
disposable income) for the full three-year applicable commitment period.139 
But the attorney and administrative fees would be paid in full first, which 
would take seventeen months, and the plan would not begin repaying 
unsecured creditors until the eighteenth month.140 These plans, however, may 
propose a higher repayment to unsecured creditors than what this Comment 
has defined as fee-only or low percentage; in fact, the plan in Brown proposed 
to repay 17% of general unsecured claims.141 But because the plans front-load 
payments to the attorney and trustee, the chances that general unsecured 
creditors will be repaid becomes more remote, even if the plan proposes some 
meaningful amount of repayment.142 
 
 132 Barnes, 2013 WL 153848, at *2; Mathis, 2013 WL 153833, at *1; Tedder, 2013 WL 145416, at *2. 
 133 Barnes, 2013 WL 153848, at *1; Mathis, 2013 WL 153833, at *1; Tedder, 2013 WL 145416, at *13.  
 134 Barnes, 2013 WL 153848, at *12; Mathis, 2013 WL 153833, at *12; Tedder, 2013 WL 145416, at 
*12–13. 
 135  Barnes, 2013 WL 153848, at *12–13; Mathis, 2013 WL 153833, at *12–13; Tedder, 2013 WL 
145416, at *13. 
 136  Barnes, 2013 WL 153848, at *12; Mathis, 2013 WL 153833, at *12; Tedder, 2013 WL 145416, at *12. 
 137  See generally Brown v. Gore (In re Brown), 742 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 138  See infra Part II.B.3. 
 139  Brown, 742 F.3d at 1311. 
 140  Id. 
 141  Id. at 1311. 
 142  See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
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B. Bad Faith Per Se? 
During the first decade following the adoption of the Code, some courts 
ruled fee-only plans were a per se violation of good faith under § 1325(a)(3). 
An extreme example is In re Lattimore, where the court held the debtors’ “zero 
payment plan” was per se bad faith, despite the debtors proposing a monthly 
payment of $214, which exceeded their monthly disposable income by $26.143 
A competing view emerged in cases like In re Greer, maintaining that first, 
fee-only plans are not per se bad faith, and second, courts should not abandon 
the totality of the circumstances test when evaluating them.144 Courts remain 
divided to this day when dealing with fee-only plans.145 Three recent federal 
circuit court decisions have held there is no per se rule against fee-only 
plans.146 The remainder of this Part discusses those opinions. 
1. Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer) and Special Circumstances 
In March 2012, the First Circuit decided In re Puffer, which involved a 
debtor with nearly $15,000 in general unsecured debt.147 The debtor’s attorney 
presented his fee schedule as follows: $2,300 from the previous chapter 7 
filing, which must be paid up front, and approximately $4100 for chapter 13 
fees, which could be paid over the course of the plan.148 As in Crager, the 
debtor lacked sufficient funds to pay the chapter 7 fees and thus filed for 
chapter 13.149 The debtor’s plan proposed $3,600 in payments over three years, 
distributed as follows: $2,900 for debtor’s attorney fees, $400 for trustee fees, 
and only $300 to general unsecured claims—approximately 2% of 
 
 143  See In re Lattimore, 69 B.R. 622, 623–26 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987) (also finding that the excessive 
payment failed the § 1325(a)(6) requirement that the debtor will be able to complete all plan payments). 
 144  See In re Greer, 60 B.R. 547, 554 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986). 
 145  Compare In re Okosisi, 451 B.R. 90, 102–03 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2011) (concluding under a totality 
standard that no payments to unsecured creditors is insufficient for finding bad faith, especially in this case, 
where “[a]ll of the [d]ebtor’s disposable income, and then some, is devoted to the plan”), with In re Jackson, 
No. 11-42528-13, 2012 WL 909782, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Mar. 16, 2012) (noting most courts find fee-only 
plans to be per se bad faith), and In re Arlen, 461 B.R. 550, 554 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2011) (holding that fee-
only plans are per se bad faith as “inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of [c]hapter 13” and failing “to 
understand how a [fee-only plan] . . . benefits anyone other than counsel”). 
 146  Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78, 79 (1st Cir. 2012); Sikes v. Crager (In re Crager), 
691 F.3d 671, 675 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 147  Puffer, 674 F.3d at 80.  
 148  Id. 
 149  Id. 
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repayment.150 The bankruptcy court held the debtor’s filing was a fee-only plan 
and therefore was per se bad faith under § 1325(a)(3) and (7).151 
The First Circuit reversed, holding fee-only plans are not per se bad 
faith.152 The court explained, “[n]otwithstanding [a fee-only plan’s] 
shortcomings, endorsing a blanket rule that fee-only [c]hapter 13 plans are per 
se submitted in bad faith would be to throw out the baby with the 
bathwater.”153 While conceding a case-by-case inquiry governs the good faith 
analysis in all chapter 13 cases,154 the court warned, “[t]his opinion should by 
no means be read as a paean to fee-only [c]hapter 13 plans. The dangers of 
such plans are manifest, and a debtor who submits such a plan carries a heavy 
burden of demonstrating special circumstances that justify its submission.”155 
Because the bankruptcy court had not applied the totality of the circumstances 
test, the court remanded the case to determine whether the plan was in good 
faith.156 While it did not offer a definitive list of special circumstances, the 
court offered guidance on the circumstances that might justify a fee-only plan: 
There is no showing, however, that the debtor had a pressing need for 
the appellant’s services, that he could not secure adequate 
representation that he could afford without resorting to a fee-only 
plan, or that it was infeasible to proceed pro se. Furthermore, the 
debtor himself asserted that he could have retained the appellant for 
representation in [c]hapter 7—a course usually more in line with the 
interests of the debtor, the creditors, and the bankruptcy court—if he 
had waited three months longer; and the record contains no 
compelling reason why a three-month wait would have been 
intolerable.157 
a. The Remand  
On remand, the bankruptcy court found the debtor’s chapter 13 plan still 
failed the good faith standard.158 Satisfied that the First Circuit had fully 
adopted the totality of the circumstances test for assessing good faith, the court 
 
 150  Id. 
 151  Id. at 81. 
 152  Id. at 82. 
 153  Id. at 83.  
 154  Id.  
 155  Id. (citing Hardin v. Caldwell (In re Caldwell), 895 F.2d 1123, 1126 (6th Cir. 1990)). 
 156  Id. 
 157  Id. 
 158  In re Puffer, 478 B.R. 101, 101, 107 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012). 
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focused its attention on whether special circumstances existed.159 The court 
noted that there “can be no exhaustive definition of the term ‘special 
circumstances,’” but emphasized the First Circuit’s notion that such 
circumstances justifying a fee-only plan are “far from the norm.”160 Instead of 
using the First Circuit’s examples, the court described the debtor’s financial 
and living situations, his vehicle repossession, the constant harassment he 
received from his creditors, and the fact he had waited 10 months to file for 
chapter 13 protection after the initial meeting with his attorney.161 Based on 
these facts, the court concluded no special circumstances existed.162 
b. Interpreting the Holding  
Special circumstances, however, is already included in most court’s list of 
totality of the circumstances factors.163 This raises ambiguity in Puffer as to 
whether 1) a showing of special circumstances is a mandatory requirement for 
fee-only plans, or 2) special circumstances is merely the most important factor 
in the totality of the circumstances test. The remand opinion from the 
bankruptcy court seemed to think the former was correct. If that is the case, 
this special circumstances requirement is similar to the abuse presumption in 
the chapter 7 means test, which if raised may be rebutted “by demonstrating 
special circumstances.”164 Analogously, a fee-only plan raises a presumption 
that the plan is in bad faith, but that presumption may be rebutted by a showing 
of special circumstances. This comparison—or a detailed procedure for 
showing special circumstances similar to § 707(b)(2)(B)—was not suggested 
by the First Circuit or the bankruptcy court on remand but the analysis appears 
to be similar.165 
 
 159  Id. at 107. 
 160  Id. 
 161  Id. at 107–08. 
 162  Id. 
 163  See supra notes 94–102 and accompanying text. 
 164 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B) (2012) (emphasis added). Section 707(b)(1) provides for a chapter 7 case 
dismissal or conversion to chapter 11 or 13 upon a finding that “the granting of relief would be an abuse of the 
provisions of this chapter.” Id. § 707(b)(1). Section 707(b)(2) provides that abuse is presumed if a debtor fails 
the means test. Id. § 707(b)(2). 
 165  See id. § 707(b)(2)(B) (setting forth detailed requirements for showing special circumstances to rebut 
the abuse presumption). 
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2. Sikes v. Crager (In re Crager) 
The Fifth Circuit decided In re Crager in August 2012.166 The debtor had 
over $40,000 in mortgage debt and over $7,800 in general unsecured consumer 
debt from credit cards.167 Despite her unemployment, reliance on food stamps, 
and that her only income was from Social Security benefits, the debtor was 
able to remain current on her mortgage and credit card payments.168 The debtor 
filed for bankruptcy after learning she would not complete her credit card 
payments for nearly two decades at her current rate of payment.169 The debtor 
filed for chapter 13 instead of chapter 7 in part due to the attorney fee 
burden.170 To save enough money to pay for the chapter 7 attorney fees up 
front, she would have been forced to forgo her credit card payments and wait 
over a year.171 The trustee objected to plan confirmation under § 1325(a)(3) 
and (7).172 
The bankruptcy court overruled the objection, but the district court reversed 
and found the plan to be in bad faith because nearly all of the plan payments 
would go to the debtor’s attorney fees.173 The Fifth Circuit reversed the district 
court, holding as a matter of law that a fee-only plan “leaving other unsecured 
creditors unpaid, is [not] a per se violation of the ‘good faith’ requirement.”174 
The court found the debtor’s fee-only plan was not an attempt to abuse chapter 
13, “but rather a responsible decision given [the debtor’s] particular 
circumstances.”175 
3. Brown v. Gore (In re Brown) 
The Eleventh Circuit weighed in the fee-only issue in February 2014 and 
also declined to adopt a per se rule.176 As discussed earlier, the debtor in 
Brown proposed an attorney-fee-centric plan where repayment to the 
unsecured creditors would not begin until the eighteenth month of the thirty-
 
 166  Sikes v. Crager (In re Crager), 691 F.3d 671 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 167  Id. at 674. 
 168  Id. 
 169  Id. 
 170  Id. 
 171  Id. 
 172  Id. 
 173  Id. 
 174  Id. at 675–76. 
 175  Id. at 675. 
 176  Brown v. Gore (In re Brown), 742 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2014). 
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six-month plan.177 The debtor’s plan proposed to pay $150 per month, a total 
of $5,400, as follows: $2,000 in attorney fees, $281 to the court as a filing fee, 
$70 to the attorney to cover the debtor’s credit report and mandatory credit 
counseling, $243 in trustee commission, and the remainder to creditors, all of 
whom were general unsecured. Full completion of the plan would result in a 
17% repayment to general unsecured creditors, taking the plan far outside the 
bounds of fee-only.178 Nevertheless, the court expressed doubt the debtor could 
successfully do so179 and treated the case as a fee-only plan that would not 
repay any creditors and would only benefit the debtor’s attorney.180 The court 
stated “there was a reasonable likelihood that Brown would not complete his 
[c]hapter 13 plan and would never pay those creditors anything.”181 
The court thoroughly recited the bankruptcy judge’s strong language 
against attorney-fee-centric plans and upheld the application of the totality of 
the circumstances test (here, using the Kitchens list of factors) under a clearly 
erroneous standard of review.182 Noting that the bankruptcy court did not adopt 
a per se rule against attorney-fee-centric or fee-only plans, the court stated, 
“Our precedent demands a multi-factor analysis of the particular facts of a case 
to determine whether good faith existed, . . . which is what the bankruptcy 
court did here.”183 
The court did not address the Puffer special circumstances approach, but 
did note that no “unique circumstances” existed that would justify why the 
debtor was better off filing for chapter 13 relief rather than chapter 7.184 This 
analysis, however, appeared to be in the context of applying the Kitchens 
factors, though the court did not expressly state it was applying the eighth 
factor, “special circumstances such as inordinate medical expense.”185  
 
 177  Supra notes 139–39 and accompanying text. 
 178  Brown, 742 F.3d at 1311. The debtor filed the plan prior to the creditors’ deadline for filing claims, 
and ultimately, only three creditors filed claims, representing less than 10% of the total debt owed. “The 
bankruptcy court speculated that few ‘creditors bothered to file claims perhaps because the likelihood of any 
meaningful payments was not feasible’ under Brown's meagre budget, and any ‘distribution from the trustee 
will be of little consequence.’” Id. 
 179 Id. 
 180  Id. at 1318. 
 181  Id. 
 182  Id. at 1313–19. 
 183  Id. at 1318–19. 
 184  Id. at 1318. 
 185  See id. at 1317–18. 
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In summary, three circuit opinions all agree that fee-only plans should not 
be automatically barred for bad faith, though Puffer potentially applies a 
modified approach to the traditional totality of the circumstances test. With this 
precedent as a backdrop, Part III proceeds with the empirical analysis to 
determine whether courts’ application the totality of the circumstances test to 
fee-only plans reveals any statistically significant trends. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
This empirical study has three goals. First, it seeks to understand whether 
chapter 13 fee-only plans are statistically significant to a court’s finding of 
good faith compared to low percentage plans. Again, this study chooses to 
define a fee-only plan as any plan proposing a 2% or less repayment to general 
unsecured creditors while paying debtor attorney fees. Second, it seeks to 
determine if any factors in the totality of the circumstances test are statistically 
significant to a finding of good faith for fee-only plans. Third, it analyzes how 
the discussion or listing186 of any factor, or combination of factors, affects a 
finding of good faith. 
Part III contains four subparts. Part III.A describes the method of analysis, 
including the types of data gathered and a description of the sample. Part III.B 
discusses the assumptions and limitations of the study, as well as any 
corresponding effects on the sample. Part III.C lists and describes the totality 
of the circumstances factors that the study coded and the specific judicial 
language that triggered coding for each factor.187 Finally, Part III.D presents 
the results of the study and offers brief insights to precede a fuller discussion 
of the implications of the results in Part IV. 
A. Method 
For the data sample, this study selected cases decided after the enactment 
of the modern Code in 1978. This wide date range recognizes that while the 
totality of the circumstances test may have evolved over time, courts have 
always encountered chapter 13 plans that pay attorney’s fees while leaving a 
nominal amount, or nothing, for general unsecured creditors.188 From this 
 
 186  See infra Part III.C. 
 187  When this study refers to coding for factors or other data points, “coding” means to account for a 
variable in a quantifiable way, such as assigning the court’s ruling on the good faith issue (one of the 
variables) a set of values. For example, the ruling on good faith is a simple binary variable: good or bad. 
 188  See supra Part I.B. 
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broad sample, the study screened cases for inclusion in the data set from two 
sources. First, the study consulted an American Law Reports article that 
analyzed rulings on the § 1325(a)(3) good faith standard as the repayment to 
general unsecured creditors changed.189 Next, the study formulated a search 
query in WestlawNext for all federal cases with the following terms and 
connectors: “1325(a)” and “good faith.”190 The purpose of this initial query 
was to capture any case in which § 1325(a)(3), § 1325(a)(7), or both were at 
issue. 
This search query was then narrowed in three iterations, independent of one 
another. The first iteration narrowed the search to cases containing the phrases 
“fee only,” “fee centric,” or “zero payment.”191 This narrowed query retrieved 
a total of 147 cases. The narrowing terms were sufficient to capture all the 
previously discussed terminologies for fee only plans except “de minimis,”192 
which was narrowed separately for convenience. The second iteration 
narrowed the search to cases containing the phrase “de minimis.” This query 
retrieved all cases with the “Amount of Repayment; De Minimis Repayment” 
headnote, a total of 365 cases.193 Finally, the third iteration included the 
following terms and connectors: (attorney! or counsel! or lawyer!) /6 (pay! or 
paid! or receiv!).194 This iteration retrieved a total of 390 cases. 
The third iteration—intended to capture additional cases that discuss 
payment to attorneys—was motivated by the Crager opinion.195 The first two 
iterations did not capture Crager because the opinion does not refer to a fee-
only plan or analogous terminology, but merely states, “There is no rule in this 
 
 189  Diane M. Allen, Annotation, Effect, on “Good-Faith” Requirement of § 1325(a)(3) of Bankruptcy 
Code of 1978 (11 USCS § 1325(a)(3)) for Confirmation of Chapter 13 Plan, of Debtor’s Offer of Less Than 
Full Repayment to Unsecured Creditors, 73 A.L.R. FED. 10, 13 (1985). 
 190  Placing a phrase in parentheses ensures that the search will only retrieve cases with the exact phrase, 
“good faith,” as opposed to any case that merely contains “good” and “faith” somewhere in the text. 
 191  This was done in WestlawNext’s “search within results” feature and inputted as: “fee only” or “fee 
centric” or “zero payment.” These singular terms also retrieve all plural and possessive forms, as well as 
hyphenations (e.g., “fee-only”).  
 192  See supra text accompanying notes 116–19. 
 193 In the Key Numbering System for Westlaw Headnotes, key number 51k3710 is entitled “Amount of 
Repayment; De Minimis Repayment.” 
 194  The exclamation point is a root expander and will retrieve any case that contains the word in front of 
the exclamation point or its variant, as long as the variant contains at least the root word. For example, using 
“attorney!” will retrieve “attorneys” and “attorney’s” in addition to “attorney.” The use of “receiv!” instead of 
“receive!” ensures retrieval of “receiving” as well. This terms and connectors string retrieves any case where at 
least one of the words or its variant in the first parenthetical appears in the text within six words of any word or 
its variant within the second parenthetical. 
 195  Sikes v. Crager (In re Crager), 691 F.3d 671 (5th Cir. 2012). 
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circuit that a [c]hapter 13 plan that results in the debtor’s counsel receiving 
almost the entire amount paid to the Trustee, leaving other unsecured creditors 
unpaid, is a per se violation of the ‘good faith’ requirement.”196 The decision to 
retrieve cases where the first string of terms falls within six words of the 
second string was based on Crager, where a term from the first string (counsel) 
appears within six words of a second string word (paid).197 While a second 
string word (receiving) did immediately follow a first string word (counsel),198 
the expansion to six words between the strings ensured broader retrieval. III.B 
discusses the practical limitations a case like Crager presents. 
Unsurprisingly, two or more of the search queries often retrieved the same 
cases. From this broad retrieval, the study then screened cases for fee-only and 
low percentage criteria—that is, chapter 13 plans proposing payment between 
0% and 10% to allowed general unsecured claims.199  
Ultimately, the study proceeded with data set 61 cases. At a minimum, 
cases used in the study include 1) a final ruling from the court on good faith 
and 2) the amount of repayment to general unsecured creditors.200 When 
coding for the general unsecured creditor repayment, this study assigned a 
percentage, defined as the total repayment to general unsecured creditors, 
divided by the total amount of general unsecured debt from allowed claims.201 
As mentioned in Part III.A., coding for the court’s ruling on good faith is a 
simple binary value, as there are only two possible outcomes: a court finds the 
plan to be in good faith or in bad faith. Before discussing the list of factors this 
study used to code for the totality of the circumstances test, Part III.B. 
discusses the assumptions and limitations of this study. 
B. Assumptions and Limitations 
This study assumed the debtor’s attorney fees in each case are an allowed 
priority administrative expense claim for which the plan must provide 
 
 196  Id. at 675–76. 
 197  Id. at 675. 
 198  Id. 
 199 As defined by this Comment, fee-only plans are those with a 0% to 2% repayment, and low percentage 
plans are those with a greater than 2% but less than or equal to 10% repayment. See supra Part II.A. 
 200 For the general unsecured creditor repayment, this means that either the case listed the percentage or 
contained sufficient, unambiguous information—the total amount of general unsecured debt and the proposed 
repayment on those claims—to calculate the percentage. See, e.g., In re Weiser, 391 B.R. 902, 910 (Bankr. 
S.D. Fla. 2008) (“proposing to pay approximately 5% of the total unsecured debt over five years”). 
 201 See supra note 115. 
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payment.202 Even beyond this one assumption, there are also four specific 
limitations to this study. 
First, some chapter 13 debtors pay their attorneys prior to filing, and such 
cases were not excluded from the study.203 Of course, the debtor may not have 
paid for legal counsel (e.g., pro bono representation or pro se filings), and if 
the opinion indicated this, the case was excluded. Otherwise, the study 
assumed that the debtor paid for an attorney. Exclusion of pro se filings was 
not problematic, as each opinion listed the attorney of record for both parties to 
the case. Pro bono representation was not always apparent from the opinion, 
but this is unlikely to have a significant impact on the data, as a recent 
bankruptcy fee study found that less than 7% of all chapter 13 filings are pro 
bono.204 
Second, cases often lacked the information necessary for inclusion in the 
study, leading to the exclusion of many potentially relevant cases (i.e., cases 
litigating § 1325(a)(3) or (7) in part because of a low repayment to unsecured 
creditors).205 Unless the percentage of repayment on total unsecured claims 
was clear in the opinion, the case was excluded. Time and resource constraints 
prevented this study from seeking plan schedules or other court documents that 
might have provided missing information or resolved these ambiguities. While 
inclusion of such cases might have affected the outcome of the data, this study 
contains an adequate sample by which to gain insight into good faith analysis 
of fee-only plans. 
 
 202 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 330(a)(4)(B), 503(b)(2), 507(a)(2), 1322(a)(2) (2012). Section 1322(a)(2) states that 
a chapter 13 plan “shall provide for the full payment . . . of all claims entitled to priority under section 507.” 
Id. § 1322(a)(2). Section 507(a)(2) lists as a priority claim “administrative expenses allowed under section 
503(b).” Id. § 507(a)(2). Section 503(b)(2) lists as an allowed administrative expense “compensation and 
reimbursement awarded under section 330(a).” Id. § 503(b)(2). Section 330(a)(4)(B) states, “[i]n a . . . chapter 
13 case . . . the court may allow reasonable compensation to the debtor’s attorney [with certain 
qualifications].” Id. § 330(a)(4)(B). 
 203 See, e.g., In re Aprea, 368 B.R. 558, 568 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2007). 
 204  Lupica, supra note 56, at 83 & n.141 (reporting that 6.8% of pre-BAPCPA chapter 13 filings and 4.9% 
of post-BAPCPA filings contained “an attorney of record on the docket listing, but there was no fee paid”). 
 205  For example, some cases may discuss a plan proposal with one or more amendments. The opinion may 
have been unclear on the contents of the final plan or under which amended version it is analyzing good faith, 
For example, In re Oliver, 186 B.R. 403, 405–06 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995), involved a three-year plan proposing 
approximately a 10% repayment to unsecured creditors—qualifying for this study as low percentage plan. The 
debtor orally amended the plan to five years, promising a roughly 17% repayment—thus taking the plan 
outside the range of this study. Then, when analyzing good faith, the court seemed to ignore the oral 
modification and assessed only the original three-year plan proposal. Id. This case was excluded from this 
study. 
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Third, it is difficult at times to determine which factors each court has truly 
considered. While some level of subjectivity is unavoidable, this study does 
not intend to parse out a court’s subjective rationale, such as the weight a judge 
gives a particular factor compared to others. Rather, the intent of the study, to 
the extent possible, is to objectively measure the factors on which a court relies 
to reach its ruling. The goal is to provide a general picture, not necessarily a 
precise measurement, of how courts treat chapter 13 cases as the general 
unsecured repayment approaches zero. Certainly there may be considerations 
that do not appear in the text of an opinion, and as courts readily admit, the 
intent of the factors is to serve as an analytical framework, not an exhaustive 
list of all considerations.206  
Fourth, and finally, the various lists of factors across jurisdictions do not 
fall into one definitive list with perfect overlap. For example, the Eighth 
Circuit’s traditional list includes “the extent of preferential treatment between 
classes of creditors”;207 while the Seventh Circuit lists “the debtor’s treatment 
of creditors both before and after the petition was filed.”208 As shown below, 
the study treats these factors analogously, though there may be practical and 
theoretical differences. As best it can, this study compiles all the factors into a 
workable list, making such discrepancies and inconsistencies unavoidable. To 
the extent possible, the study groups similar concepts together to serve the 
purpose of identifying statistically significant considerations courts use to 
address good faith in fee-only plans. The next section will offer some examples 
of these challenges and the study’s treatment of them. 
C. Factors Used in Determining Good Faith 
This study gathered data on the totality of the circumstances factors that a 
case opinion lists and those that it discusses. Listed factors are those that the 
court lists in each case. This study coded listed factors as simple binary values: 
a case either lists a given factor or it does not. If the court does not list its 
factors but cites to previous binding authority that does, those factors are coded 
as listed in the present case. If there was any ambiguity, such as citation to 
multiple authorities, this study coded for the factor list on which the court most 
clearly relies.209 
 
 206 Supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 207  See Estus, 695 F.2d at 317. 
 208 See In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350, 1357 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 209 For example, suppose the text of the opinion cites to authority with a factor listing, but there is also an 
express listing of factors from another authority in a footnote. In that circumstance the study counted the actual 
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Likewise, this study coded discussed factors as simple binary values: a case 
either discusses a given factor or it does not. Discussed factors are those that 
are determinative to a court’s ruling on good faith. Because very few opinions 
contain distinct sections or paragraphs analyzing a particular factor,210 this 
study counted any identifiable analysis of the totality of the circumstances 
under the facts of the case.211 As Part III.B. explained above, a court’s 
subjective analysis may implicate more than one factor in ways that are not 
easily separable. The remainder of this Part explains those challenges within 
the context of each factor and how the study addressed them. 
The following sections present the list of factors that this study coded. 
Included is a brief description of each factor, its various phrasings and 
examples where the study coded for it, and any theoretical overlaps. When 
practical and unambiguous, this Comment refers to each factor by its 
Subsection number (e.g., “Factor 1”). 
1. Percent Repayment to General Unsecured Creditors (“Factor 1”) 
Despite Factor 1’s clear relevance to fee-only plans, it rarely appears in a 
factor list. Regardless of whether it stood alone or in concert with another 
consideration, this study coded for Factor 1 any time the court discussed the 
low (or lack of) payment to general unsecured creditors.212 
For example, one court found that a chapter 13 plan was in bad faith where 
the debtor proposed to pay nothing to general unsecured creditors, to continue 
 
list in the footnote, not the list from the text citation. See, e.g., In re Sanchez, No. 13-09-10955, 2009 WL 
2913224, at *2 n.3 (Bankr. D.N.M. May 19, 2009). 
 210 Compare In re Thomas, 443 B.R. 213, 217–19 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2010) (not including distinct 
sections), with In re Lancaster. 280 B.R. 468, 480–82 (W.D. Mo. 2002) (including distinct, numbered 
paragraphs for the discussion of each factor). 
 211 But many opinions do analyze good faith under a distinct, identifiable heading. See, e.g., Thomas, 443 
B.R. at 217 (using “Good Faith” as a heading). Others did not, but this study only included such cases when 
the analysis of good faith was clearly identifiable. See, e.g., In re Molina, 420 B.R. 825, 827–33 (Bankr. 
D.N.M. 2009) (containing only an “Analysis” heading, but included in the study because discussion of good 
faith was easily identifiable). 
 212  See United States v. Smith (In re Smith), 199 B.R. 56, 59 (N.D. Okla. 1996). Factor 1 was coded in 
this case due to the following: “The fact that the unsecured claim was previously not discharged, that the 
Appellees had previously filed under [c]hapter 7, and that Appellant’s unsecured claims will receive a [2%] 
pro rata payment does not mean that the Bankruptcy Court’s finding that the Plan was filed in good faith is 
clearly erroneous.” Id. at 59 (emphasis added). 
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monthly payments into a retirement account, and to retain all secured assets.213 
While the Code otherwise authorizes this approach, the court clarified, 
“Achieving an appropriate balance between payment of unsecured creditors 
and saving retirement funds is the natural end of viewing the totality of 
[d]ebtor’s circumstances.”214 This language strongly suggests, if not expressly 
states, that neither the 0% repayment nor the retirement account contributions 
alone would be sufficient for the court to find bad faith. In this particular 
circumstance, this case coded for two factors: Factor 1 and the debtor’s budget 
proposal (Factor 8).215 In another case, Factor 1 and fairness to creditors 
(Factor 12) were coded when the debtor’s plan “provides for inconsistent 
treatment of similarly situated creditors in that it would allow an apparently 
undersecured mortgage creditor to receive a full cure of its undersecured claim 
while other unsecured creditors receive a de minimis payment.”216 
2. Substantial Repayment Above the § 1325(a)(4) “Best Interests of 
Creditors” (“Factor 2”) 
As previously discussed, the amount of unsecured debt repayment relative 
to a chapter 7 liquidation was particularly relevant to good faith analysis prior 
to the enactment of § 1325(b) in 1984.217 Section 1325(b) requires all projected 
disposable income to go toward the plan during the applicable commitment 
period.218 Nevertheless, retaining Factor 2 as well as pre-1984 cases is 
important to capture the development of chapter 13 good faith analysis over 
time. This study coded for Factor 2 even in post-1984 cases when the court 
clearly referred to § 1325(a)(4) in its good faith analysis.219 
 
 213 In re Shelton, 370 B.R. 861, 868–69 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2007) (holding that a chapter 13 “plan that 
proposes to pay 0% to creditors when a debtor could pay substantially more is not a plan proposed in good 
faith”). 
 214  Id. at 869. 
 215  As another example of coding for Factor 1 and Factor 8, see In re Klaven, No. 11-41677, 2012 WL 
2930865, at *1 (Bankr. D. Mass. July 18, 2012) (finding bad faith in a fee-only plan involving nearly $200,000 
of general unsecured debt where the debtor proposed to retain a vacation time share through monthly payments 
of $480, and noting that “chapter 13 is . . . a bargain between debtors and creditors” and that the plan “tilts so 
dramatically in the debtors’ favor as to cause the plan to fail the test of good faith”). 
 216  In re Namie, 395 B.R. 594, 597 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2008). Notwithstanding payment of the entire 
unsecured portion of the mortgage claim, the total repayment on general unsecured claims was only 1%. Id. at 
596. 
 217  See supra Part I.C.1. 
 218  11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (2012). 
 219  See, e.g., Ingram v. Burchard, 482 B.R. 313, 322 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (listing “unsecured creditors would 
receive the same dividend they would have if the case had been filed as a Chapter 7,” as a factor that favored 
plan confirmation). 
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3. Plan Duration (“Factor 3”) 
Section 1322(d) provides that a chapter 13 plan’s duration may not be 
longer than either three or five years, depending on whether the income of the 
debtor and debtor’s spouse is above or below median income.220 Within these 
constraints, the ultimate length of a debtor’s plan can be discretionary.221 
Courts consider this factor as a measure of the debtor’s genuine willingness to 
produce a fair repayment to creditors, especially if the plan duration is directly 
tied to the attorney fees.222 While wording may vary, this factor is uniformly 
used and straightforwardly applied across courts providing a factor lists.223 
This study coded for Factor 3 whenever the court discussed the plan 
duration’s effect on good faith, unless the court merely stated the statutory 
applicable commitment period for a given plan.224 For example, this study 
coded for Factor 3 when a court stated, “If unsecured creditors are only going 
to receive 5%, an unmeaningful recovery, a good faith issue arises for the 
debtor unless the debtor extends the recovery period to five years making the 
recovery for unsecured creditors more meaningful.”225 Cases with early 
termination language, as discussed in Part II of this Comment, were coded for 
Factor 3.226 
4. The Amount, Nature, and Type of General Unsecured Debts (“Factor 
4”) 
Phrasings of Factor 4 in court taxonomies include “the type of debt sought 
to be discharged and whether any such debt is nondischargeable in [c]hapter 
7”;227 “the circumstances under which the debt was incurred”;228 “the nature 
 
 220  11 U.S.C. § 1322(d). 
 221  See supra Part II.A.1. 
 222  E.g., In re Lavilla, 425 B.R. 572, 578–79 (Bankr. E.D. Ca. 2010) (citing In re Paley, 390 B.R. 53, 56, 
59 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2008)). See also supra Part II.A.1. 
 223 See Soc’y Nat’l Bank v. Barrett (In re Barrett), 964 F.2d 588, 592 (6th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he expected 
duration of the [c]hapter 13 plan . . . .”); Kitchens v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co. (In re Kitchens), 702 F.2d 
885, 888 (11th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he probable or expected duration of the debtor’s [c]hapter 13 plan . . . .”); 
Deans v. O’Donnell (In re Deans), 692 F.2d 968, 972 (4th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he period of time payment will be 
made . . . .”). 
 224  But see In re Tobiason, 185 B.R. 59, 63–64 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995). In this case the objecting creditors 
put the plan’s duration at issue under the good faith standard, and the court discussed the merits of the 
objection by turning to the statutory requirements for plan duration. Id. at 63–64. In this circumstance, the 
study coded for Factor 3. 
 225  In re Williams, 231 B.R. 280, 282 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1999) (emphasis added). 
 226  See supra Part II.A.1. 
 227  United States v. Estus (In re Estus), 695 F.2d 311, 317 (8th Cir. 1982). 
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and amount of unsecured claims”;229 “how the debt arose”;230 and “the debtor’s 
[prepetition] conduct that gave rise to the debts.”231 Courts announce these 
concepts both independently and as part of the same factor; however, courts 
within the same jurisdiction may separate or combine the concepts in later 
cases.232 This study combined these concepts into one factor given their 
commonality. Courts’ phrasings of both factors pertain to the characteristics of 
the specific general unsecured debts in the case, such as the total amount and 
whether they are dischargeable in chapter 7. 
Coding for this factor included discussion of the debtor’s prepetition 
behavior, such as debtors who sought to discharge debt from a fraudulent 
mortgage scheme.233 Fraudulently obtained debt is a common occurrence in 
chapter 13 good faith cases.234 One might think that fraud alone likely weighs 
toward a finding of bad faith. But courts occasionally reach a contrary result 
when other circumstances favorable to the debtor are present. For example, one 
court ruled in favor of a debtor who proposed to pay only $20,000 of a 
$267,000 court judgment arising from fraudulent behavior while serving in a 
fiduciary capacity.235 The court explained, “There is no question that [the 
debtor’s behavior] was deplorable . . . [but] this consideration alone, however, 
is not sufficient to defeat [the debtor’s] plan.”236 After noting that Congress 
had allowed certain debts to be nondischargeable in chapter 7 but 
dischargeable in chapter 13, the court stated, “What is required is that the plan 
must be proposed in good faith, not that the debt was incurred in good 
faith.”237 The study coded for Factor 4 in this case. 
 
 228  Barrett, 964 F.2d at 592.  
 229  Deans v. O’Donnell (In re Deans), 692 F.2d 968, 972 (4th Cir. 1982). 
 230  In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350, 1357 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 231  Solomon v. Cosby (In re Solomon), 67 F.3d 1128, 1134 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 232  See In re Ault, 271 B.R. 617, 620 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2002) (citations omitted). The court announced as 
separate factors the types of debt sought to be discharged and also whether a debt would be non-dischargeable 
in chapter 7. Id. Yet, the Eighth Circuit cases to which it attributes these two factors actually treat them as one. 
Estus, 695 F.2d at 317; Ault, 271 B.R. at 620 (citing Handeen v. LeMaire (In re LeMaire), 898 F.2d 1346, 
1349 (8th Cir. 1990)).  
 233  In re Weiser, 391 B.R. 902, 909–10 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008) (discussing at length the origin of debt 
from a mortgage scheme in which the debtors were probably participating, but at least behaving “recklessly”). 
 234  See, e.g., In re Keach, 225 B.R. 264, 269 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1998) (finding bad faith where “nearly all of 
the Debtor’s pre-[c]hapter 7 nondischargeable debt arose from his fraudulent actions; claims on which he now 
proposes to pay only a minimal dividend”). 
 235  In re Smith 286 F.3d 461, 463–64 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 236  Id. at 467. 
 237  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
CLAMON GALLEYSPROOFS2 8/7/2014 12:16 PM 
508 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 30 
5. Debtor’s Past Bankruptcy Filings (“Factor 5”) 
Phrasings for Factor 5 include “debtor’s past bankruptcy filings”238 and 
“the frequency with which the debtor has sought relief under the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act.”239 This study coded for Factor 5 when, for example, a court 
discussed the debtor’s current ineligibility for chapter 7 due to a recent 
discharge, thereby forcing the debtor into chapter 13.240 When the subsequent 
chapter 13 filing is a fee-only plan, courts have expressed concern that this 
behavior undermines the Code’s timeline for successive filings.241 
Previous filings have always played a role in good faith assessments, 
especially prior dismissals.242 Debtors often use multiple bankruptcy chapters 
in sophisticated ways. A common example is a so-called “chapter 20” case,243 
when a debtor files for chapter 13 relief after a chapter 7 discharge and the 
debtor seeks, for example, to “strip off” a wholly unsecured junior lien on his 
primary residence.244 Chapter 20’s usefulness has been limited by BAPCPA, 
 
 238  See Solomon v. Cosby (In re Solomon), 67 F.3d 1128, 1134 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 239  See Kitchens v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co. (In re Kitchens), 702 F.2d 885, 889 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(citation omitted). 
 240  See, e.g., In re Paley, 390 B.R. 53, 54–55, 59 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that two consolidated 
cases—each involving previous chapter 7 discharges—were, “[r]educed to their cores . . . two cases with 
debtors ineligible for [c]hapter 7 discharges seeking another round of debt forgiveness”). 
 241  See, e.g., id. at 59–60 (citations omitted) (“These cases, basically [c]hapter 7 cases hidden within 
[c]hapter 13 petitions, blur the distinction between the chapters into a meaningless haze. To allow them to go 
forward would, in effect, judicially invalidate § 727(a)(8)’s requirement of an eight year hiatus between 
[c]hapter 7 discharges and replace it with either the four year break required by § 1328(f)(1), or the two year 
gap mandated by § 1328(f)(2).”). 
 242 See In re Hurt, 369 B.R. 274, 281–82 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2007) (finding bad faith when two previous 
chapter 13 filings were dismissed due to default); In re Thornes, 386 B.R. 903, 910 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2007) 
(finding bad faith in third chapter 13 filing when debtor failed to show a substantial change in conditions after 
previous two cases were dismissed). 
 243  “Chapter 20” refers generally to successive filings of 1) a chapter 7 plan and 2) a subsequent chapter 
13 plan “to further restructure secured debt”—often in the form of lien stripping—or deal with debt that is 
nondischargeable in chapter 7 but is dischargeable in chapter 13. Lawrence Ponoroff, Hey the Sun Is Hot and 
the Water’s Fine: Why Not Strip Off That Lien?, 30 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 13, 17 n.18 (2013). See also In re 
Cushman, 217 B.R. 470, 473, 476–78 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998) (citation omitted) (describing chapter 20 as “a 
chapter 13 case brought while the ink on the debtor’s chapter 7 discharge is just barely dry,” and finding bad 
faith when, during chapter 7 proceedings, the debtor converted a car lease into an installment purchase 
agreement, secured by the car, and then filed for chapter 13 months later to strip down the lien—that is, 
discharge the unsecured portion of the debt). 
 244 See, e.g., Fisette v. Keller (In re Fisette), 455 B.R. 177, 184–86 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011). See generally 
Ponoroff, supra note 243 (providing a thorough analysis of lien stripping in bankruptcy). 
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which added § 1328(f) to address the effect of past filings on obtaining a 
chapter 13 discharge.245 
This study does not include chapter 20 cases when the debtor is ineligible 
for a chapter 13 discharge under § 1328(f), but nevertheless files to strip off a 
wholly unsecured junior lien. These cases raise special concerns, including an 
unresolved split in case law.246 To the extent that their inclusion may change 
this study’s analysis, the most likely effect would be to increase the frequency 
in which courts discuss Factor 5 and Factor 12 (fairness to creditors). 
Otherwise, this study includes chapter 20247 and “veiled chapter 7”248 cases and 
likely coded for Factor 5 in each. 
6. Debtor’s Honesty and Accuracy of Schedules and Statements (“Factor 
6”) 
Misrepresentations in bankruptcy filing schedules, or other acts of 
dishonesty during the judicial process, weigh heavily on a court’s evaluation of 
good faith, even before the enactment of the modern Code.249 After BAFJA 
and BAPCPA, many courts suggested that the income-based factors are less 
important and instead focused on indications of dishonesty.250 Factor 6 has 
many phrasings but generally pertains to any attempt to mislead the court or 
creditors through inaccuracies in the statements and schedules filed during the 
case.251 One court noted that good faith may be ambiguous but “certainly 
 
 245 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f) (2012) (rendering chapter 13 debtors ineligible for a discharge if they received a 
discharge under chapters 7, 11, or 12 within four years prior to filing a chapter 13 petition). 
 246 See Bryan J. Hall, Stripping Liens to Save Their Homes: Debtors’ Options to Reduce Mortgage Debt 
in Bankruptcy, FED. LAW., Jan./Feb. 2013, at 56 (discussing the split) (citing Fisette v. Keller (In re Fisette), 
455 B.R. 177, 185–86 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011) (in a chapter 20 case, holding that modifying a wholly unsecured 
lien in chapter 13 is not conditioned on eligibility for a discharge); In re Orkwis, 457 B.R. 243, 250 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.Y. 2011) (in a chapter 20 case, holding that a wholly unsecured lien may not be avoided in chapter 13 
unless the debtor receives a discharge in the chapter 13 case)). 
 247 In re Keach, 225 B.R. 264, 267 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1998) (citations omitted). 
 248 Ingram v. Burchard, 482 B.R. 313, 319 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citation omitted). 
 249 See Johnson, supra note 98, at 378–79. 
 250  See In re Shelton, 370 B.R. 861, 868-69 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2007); Baxter v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 
346 B.R. 256, 261-62 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006). 
 251  In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350, 1357 (7th Cir. 1992) (listing “whether the debtor has been forthcoming 
with the bankruptcy court and the creditors”); Hardin v. Caldwell (In re Caldwell), 895 F.2d 1123, 1126 (6th 
Cir. 2001) (listing “the accuracy of the plan’s statements of the debts, expenses and percentage repayment of 
unsecured debt and whether any inaccuracies are an attempt to mislead the court”) (quoting United States v. 
Estus (In re Estus), 695 F.2d 311, 317 (8th Cir. 1982)); In re Ault, 271 B.R. 617, 619-20 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 
2002) (listing “whether the debtor has accurately stated his debts and expenses on his bankruptcy statements 
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does . . . require ‘honesty of intention.’”252 The study coded for Factor 6 
discussion is based on the following language: 
The debtor has not been forthcoming with the [c]ourt or the [c]hapter 
13 trustee regarding his income and expenses. The debtor’s 
statements regarding his fiancée’s contributions to his household 
income have been inconsistent, and the [c]ourt did not find his 
testimony at the confirmation hearing to be credible on this issue.253 
 The court followed this with details on the inaccuracies it saw in the 
debtor’s forms and schedules.254 In a more subtle example—and one that 
pointed towards a finding of good faith—this study coded for Factor 6 when 
the court stated, “[The debtor] has accurately stated his debts, assets and 
liabilities and, in this regard, has been forthcoming with the court.”255 
7. Debtor’s Special Circumstances (“Factor 7”) 
While Puffer may open the door to a separate “special circumstances” 
analysis specifically for fee-only plans,256 courts have always analyzed special 
circumstances in chapter 13 good faith analysis, such as unanticipated health 
care expenses.257 While “special circumstances” may suggest this is a broad, 
catch-all factor, courts typically do not face much litigation over good faith 
(fee-only plans or otherwise) where such circumstances exist, perhaps because 
adverse parties do not raise the objection when a clear debtor hardship is 
present. 
This study coded for Factor 7 based on reference to special or exigent 
circumstances. A common example of Factor 7 discussion coding occurs when 
a court notes a lack of special circumstances that would justify a fee-only plan, 
such as the following: “[n]either is there any evidence that the [d]ebtors were 
 
and schedules” and “whether the debtor has made any fraudulent misrepresentation in connection with the case 
to mislead the Bankruptcy Court or his creditors”). 
 252  Johnson v. Vanguard Holding Corp. (In re Johnson), 708 F.2d 865, 868 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting Barnes 
v. Whelan (In re Barnes), 689 F.2d 193, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). 
 253  In re Aprea, 368 B.R. 558, 568 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2007). 
 254  Id. 
 255  In re Ristic, 142 B.R. 856, 860 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1992); see also id. at 860 n.3. 
 256  Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 257  See Sikes v. Crager (In re Crager), 691 F.3d 671, 675 (5th Cir. 2012); In re Corino, 191 B.R. 283, 289 
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995) (listing medical costs as an example of special circumstances in the court’s list of 
factors). 
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facing any exigency, such as the loss of a home or a car, which would render 
them unable to save the amount of counsel fees over a period of time.”258 
8. Debtor’s Budget Proposal (“Factor 8”) 
Factor 8 differs from Factor 6 (debtor’s honesty and accuracy of schedules 
and statements), in that it is not an assessment of fraud or misrepresentation, 
but of the overall reasonableness of the debtor’s financial plan. In assessing the 
overall plan, considerations for reasonableness include current income and 
proposed living expenses,259 plan payments relative to the debtor’s overall 
finances,260 excluded or exempted assets that might create greater surplus for 
creditors,261 and ultimately whether these components result in a fair 
distribution to creditors.262 Furthermore, debtors sometimes propose to pay 
more than their projected disposable income, which is the only amount 
required by statute, such as when the disposable income test results in a 
negative value.263 Such an effort could support a finding of good faith but may 
not be outcome-determinative.264 
As an example, this study coded for Factor 8 based on the following 
language: 
The debtor provides complete or nearly complete financial support 
for his fiancée, and his amended Schedule J shows that he anticipates 
spending more than $700 a month on food and recreation. The debtor 
leases a new, luxury vehicle for his unemployed fiancée to drive. He 
plans to continue paying his fiancée’s expenses and contributing 15% 
of his monthly salary to his 401k. The debtor also proposes to 
 
 258  In re Arlen, 461 B.R. 550, 555 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2011); see also In re Shelton, 370 B.R. 861, 868–69 
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2007) (“Absent disability, Debtor’s age . . . or other extenuating circumstances, foregoing or 
substantially reducing retirement contributions for the length of the plan is unlikely to unreasonably impair 
Debtor’s ability to obtain his fresh start.”). 
 259  E.g., Soc’y Nat’l Bank v. Barrett (In re Barrett), 964 F.2d 588, 592 (6th Cir. 1992); In re Farmer, 186 
B.R. 781, 783 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1995). 
 260  United States v. Estus (In re Estus), 695 F.2d 311, 317 (8th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he amount of the proposed 
payments and the amount of the debtor’s surplus….”). 
 261  In re Thomas, 443 B.R. 213, 217 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2010) (citations omitted). 
 262  Soc’y Nat’l Bank v. Barrett (In re Barrett), 964 F.2d 588, 592 (6th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he amount of 
payment offered by debtor as indicative of the debtor’s sincerity to repay the debt . . . .”). 
 263  See, e.g., In re McDonald, 437 B.R. 278, 280 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010). 
 264  Compare In re Spruch, 410 B.R. 839, 840–41, 844 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2008) (finding good faith where 
the debtor had a statutory disposable income of negative $1,311 but proposed a monthly payment plan of 
$1,900), with In re McDonald, 437 B.R. at 280–81, 293 (finding bad faith despite debtor’s statutory disposable 
income of negative $1,239 and a proposed monthly payment plan of $5,000 for 60 months). 
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continue making direct payments to Sony for his 50″ television set 
and surround sound system.265 
In another interesting example of Factor 8 coding, one plan sought to retain a 
vacation property while leaving general unsecured creditors with no 
repayment: 
Here, the debtors propose to pay their unsecured creditors nothing 
while retaining a vacation venue costing them at least $314 per 
month, net of any rental income they may receive. Redirecting the 
funds dedicated to the Disney timeshare to their chapter 13 plan 
instead, even after reserving a reasonable monthly allowance for 
recreation, would result in a meaningful dividend to unsecured 
creditors.266 
9. Debtor’s Employment History and Prospects (“Factor 9”) 
The likelihood of a debtor successfully completing a chapter 13 plan rests 
on the viability of his future income stream. While the projection of future 
disposable income falls within a separate chapter 13 provision, 
§ 1325(b)(1)(B),267 courts still look to the debtor’s employment when assessing 
good faith.268 Phrasings include “the debtor’s employment history, ability to 
earn and likelihood of future increases in income”;269 “the debtor’s ability to 
earn and the likelihood of fluctuation in his earnings”;270 and “the debtor’s 
employment history and prospects.”271 Like most courts, this study also treats 
Factor 9 separately from the debtor’s income, a component of Factor 8.272 
 
 265 In re Aprea, 368 B.R. 558, 568 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2007). Unsurprisingly, the court found this plan to 
be in bad faith. Id. at 567. 
  266  In re Klaven, No. 11-41677, 2012 WL 2930865, at *1 (Bankr. D. Mass. July 18, 2012). 
  267  11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (2012); see Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 509, 524 (2010) (holding 
that projecting future disposable income is “forward-looking” and “may account for changes in the debtor’s 
income or expenses that are known or virtually certain at the time of confirmation”). 
 268  See In re Dunning, 157 B.R. 51 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding bad faith where self-employed sales 
representative’s earnings significantly increased but only proposed a 1% repayment to unsecured creditors); In 
re Dos Passos, 45 B.R. 240, 243 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (finding good faith in dentist’s chapter 13 plan where, 
“[a]lthough the [10% repayment to unsecured creditors] is low and the debtor is a skilled professional, his past 
employment history is not marked by success”). 
 269  United States v. Estus (In re Estus), 695 F.2d 311, 317 (8th Cir. 1982). 
 270  Kitchens v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co. (In re Kitchens), 702 F.2d 885, 889 (11th Cir. 1983). 
 271  Deans v. O’Donnell (In re Deans), 692 F.2d 968, 972 (4th Cir. 1982). 
 272  See, e.g., In re Molina, 420 B.R. 825, 828 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2009) (applying Factor 8 by stating that the 
“[d]ebtor’s monthly surplus is $50, exactly what she is committing to the plan,” and applying Factor 9 by 
stating that from the schedules filed, the debtor “did not expect any increases or decreases in income or 
expenses,” and that the debtor’s job and age did “not suggest the likelihood of a significant increase in 
income”). 
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Factor 9 intends to assess the debtor’s ability to earn future income and any 
fluctuations that may alter the projection of future income.273 This study coded 
for Factor 9 any time a court addressed the debtor’s present or future 
employment.274 
10.  Amount of Attorney’s Fees (“Factor 10”) 
BAPCPA addressed fees by establishing more rigid pre-filing standards for 
bankruptcy counsel, including disclosing fee amounts.275 In response to 
BAPCPA, bankruptcy courts now usually require debtors’ counsel to submit a 
fee application that itemizes services rendered for the case.276 Many 
jurisdictions have established a “no look” fee concept, where the court allows 
an attorney to claim a “presumptively reasonable” fee up to a given amount 
without filing a fee application.277 While a presumptively reasonable fee would 
seem to pass good faith muster, that is not entirely clear. The reasonableness of 
attorney’s fees is often litigated separately from good faith, and the study did 
not code for Factor 11 when this occurred.278 The timing of fee payment, 
however, may also suggest bad faith if it evidences a debtor’s ability to pay 
more into the plan than he proposed.279 
Unsurprisingly for a data set comprised of fee-only and low percentage 
plans, attorney fees are mentioned frequently in the opinions. The focus of 
Factor 10, however, is on the fee amount, not the extent that plan payments are 
composed of attorney fees. For this reason, this study only coded for Factor 10 
when the fee amount was at issue; furthermore, the amount must have been at 
 
 273  See, e.g., id. 
 274  E.g., In re Baird, 234 B.R. 546, 553 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999) (“At the confirmation hearing, [d]ebtor 
appeared to have regained much of his health and now, according to his testimony and Memorandum, is 
hopeful of gaining employment in his area of his expertise in the near future…. [T]he Court finds [d]ebtor in a 
position to substantially increase his payment to creditors throughout the life of his plan.”). 
 275  11 U.S.C. § 528(a) (2012) (stating in part, “[a] debt relief agency shall . . . execute a written contract 
with [the debtor] that explains clearly and conspicuously . . . the fees or charges for [services rendered], and 
the terms of payment”). 
 276  Lupica, supra note 56, at 39. 
 277  Id. at 40; see also Kennedy, Lantin, & Heilig, supra note 68, at 4–6. Nevertheless, courts may still 
scrutinize a “presumptively reasonable” fee. See Lupica, supra note 56, at 40–41 & n.58; see also, e.g., In re 
Debtor’s Attorney Fees in Chapter 13 Cases, 374 B.R. 903, 906–09 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007) (establishing, sua 
sponte, a presumptively reasonable fee plan but also allowing any party in interest to object to the fee within 
10 days of the fee award). 
  278  See, e.g., Sikes v. Crager (In re Crager), 691 F.3d 671, 675 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 279  See In re Steinhorn, 27 B.R. 43, 45 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983) (finding bad faith where court noted “that 
these debtors were able to pay their attorney $1,000 before they filed this petition, more than they propose to 
pay all their creditors for the next seven months”). 
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issue under good faith analysis, not another legal provision pertaining to 
fees.280 
11.  Trustee’s Burden (“Factor 11”) 
The most common phrasing of Factor 11 is “the burden which the plan’s 
administration would place upon the trustee.”281 This study coded for Factor 11 
when plans may pose unique challenges to the trustee.282 While it is very 
common in factor lists, Factor 11 rarely arises as a distinct concern in good 
faith analysis.283 
12.  Fairness to Creditors (“Factor 12”) 
While a fair distribution of the debtor’s assets to creditors lies at the heart 
of any bankruptcy plan, courts have carved out Factor 12 for good faith 
analysis. To constitute Factor 12, this study combined several factors from 
various courts’ lists, including “the extent of preferential treatment between 
classes of creditors”;284 “the extent to which secured claims are modified”;285 
“the debtor’s treatment of creditors both before and after the petition was 
filed”;286 and “how the debtor’s actions affected creditors.”287 Kull and other 
cases list the former two as separate factors in the list.288 While preferential 
treatment between creditor classes and modification of secured claims are 
distinct concepts, this study chose to combine them into a general category, 
partly because courts simply did not discuss modification of secured claims in 
the analyzed cases. 
 
 280  In re Arlen, 461 B.R. 550, 554–55 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2011) (coding for Factor 10 when the court, 
while analyzing the good faith of the plan, notes, “[t]he fees charged by counsel in this case are approximately 
twice what would be charged for [c]hapter 7 proceedings for these [d]ebtors”). 
 281  United States v. Estus (In re Estus), 695 F.2d 311, 317 (8th Cir. 1982). 
 282  See In re Loper, 367 B.R. 660, 661 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2007) (finding no undue burden on trustee). 
 283  Only 2 cases in this study’s data set discussed this factor. Ingram v. Burchard, 482 B.R. 313, 322 (N.D. 
Cal. 2012); In re Lancaster, 280 B.R. 468, 482 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2002). 
 284  Estus, 695 F.2d at 317. 
 285  Id. 
 286  In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350, 1357 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 287  In re Aprea, 368 B.R. 558, 568 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2007). 
 288  Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co. v. Kull (In re Kull), 12 B.R. 654, 659 (S.D. Ga. 1981). 
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13.  Debtor’s Motivation (“Factor 13”) 
Phrasings for factor 13 include “the motivation and sincerity of the debtor 
in seeking [c]hapter 13 relief”;289 “the timing of the petition”;290 “[w]hether the 
debtor has unfairly manipulated the [] Code in any aspect of his plan”;291 and 
“whether the [c]hapter 13 filing was an attempt to defer or avoid the claims of 
legitimate creditors.”292 Factor 13 is especially susceptible to conceptual 
overlap with other factors as well as the foundational inquiry of good faith 
analysis: whether the proposal is an “abuse of the provisions, purpose or spirit” 
of chapter 13.293 Courts, however, do examine the factor separately,294 and 
trustees often cite Factor 13 when raising their good faith objections.295 For 
example, this study coded for Factor 13 based on the following language: “The 
sole and overriding purpose of this [b]ankruptcy is to discharge an otherwise 
nondischargeable debt. [A single claim] represents 100% of the unsecured 
debt. This motivation and intention to escape nearly all liability of this debt 
hardly comports with the true ‘spirit and purpose’ of [c]hapter 13.”296 
 The following is another example where the study coded for Factor 13: 
“The bottom line is whether the debtor is attempting to thwart his creditors, or 
is making an honest effort to repay them to the best of his ability. There is little 
doubt that the [d]ebtors are attempting to manipulate the [] Code to ‘thwart’ 
this one [c]reditor.”297 
D. Results 
This Subsection presents the results of the empirical analysis. This study 
examined four possible sets of predictors in litigation under the good faith 
 
 289  Estus, 695 F.2d at 317; see also Kitchens v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co. (In re Kitchens), 702 F.2d 
885, 889 (11th Cir. 1983) (almost identical).  
 290  Love, 957 F.2d at 1357. 
 291  In re Wilcox, 251 B.R. 59, 65 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2000) (citation omitted). 
 292  In re Vick, 327 B.R. 477, 486 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005). 
 293  Ravenot v. Rimgale (In re Rimgale), 669 F.2d 426, 431 (7th Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 294  See, e.g., In re Zellmer, 465 B.R. 517, 524–25 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2012) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (noting first that the central focus of good faith analysis is whether the plan is an “abuse of the 
provisions, purpose or spirit of [c]hapter 13,” then listing “whether [the debtor] has unfairly manipulated the [] 
Code” as a factor, and finally applying that factor to the case). 
 295  See Meyer v. Lepe (In re Lepe), 470 B.R. 851, 858–59 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). 
 296  In re Jacobs, 102 B.R. 239, 242 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1988) (quoting In re Sanders, 28 B.R. 917, 922 
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 297  In re Dicey, 312 B.R. 456, 460 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2004) (quoting In re Virden, 279 B.R. 401, 409 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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standards of § 1325(a)(3) and (7). This study seeks to determine 1) if the 
percentage repayment to general unsecured creditors is a statistically 
significant predictor of a finding of good faith, as compared to low percentage 
plans with repayment of greater than 2%; 2) if the number of listed or 
discussed factors in a courts’ totality of the circumstances test is a statistically 
significant predictor of a finding of good faith; 3) if the listing or discussion of 
any single factor is a statistically significant predictor of a finding of good 
faith; and 4) if any combination of listed or discussed factors occurs at a 
statistically significant rate. As a preliminary matter, the courts reached a 
finding of good faith in 26% of the 61 cases in the data set. 
With respect to the first set of predictors, the general unsecured creditor 
repayment is not statistically significant to a finding of good faith in the data 
set. Regarding the second set of predictors, neither the number of factors 
discussed nor the number of factors listed in a case are statistically significant 
to a finding of good faith in the data set.  
However, the difference between the number of listed factors and discussed 
factors is a statistically significant predictor of a good faith finding. Using a 
logistic regression model, as the number of factors discussed in a case 
decreases in relation to the number of factors listed in a case, the odds of the 
court finding good faith decreases at a statistically significant rate (p = 0.019). 
For each additional unit of increase in the difference (i.e., each time a court 
discusses one less factor than it lists), the odds of a good faith finding decrease 
by a factor of 0.78. Table 1 depicts this model: 
Table 1: Logistic Regression Model for Good Faith Finding 
 
Independent Variable Odds Ratio 
Difference in Number of Listed and Discussed Factors 0.779* (0.632, 0.960) 
Note: N = 61. * p ≤ 0.05. Odds ratio presented with 95% confidence interval in 
parentheses.298 
For example, if a court lists twelve factors and discusses two factors rather 
than three, the odds of the court finding good faith decreases by 22.1%.299 
Although measuring judges’ subjective decision-making quantitatively has 
 
 298  This means that with 95% certainty, the odds ratio could be as low as 0.632 and as high as 0.960. 
 299  With 95% certainty, this figure could be as low as 1.4% and as high as 31.3%. 
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limitations, the study’s results suggest that judges do narrow their focus when 
finding a fee-only or low-percentage plan to be in bad faith. One might say this 
also suggests the converse: judges cast a broader net to justify good faith in a 
fee-only plan.300 
Overall, the data show much less correlation than hypothesized. The result 
is nevertheless insightful, and Part IV provides further discussion. The 
remainder of this Subsection discusses each statistically significant relationship 
with respect to the third and fourth sets of predictors. 
1. Significant Relationships Between Factors and a Finding of Good Faith 
A statistically significant relationship (at the 10% level) exists between a 
discussion of Factor 2 (substantial repayment above the § 1325(a)(4) standard) 
and a finding of good faith. Of the opinions analyzed, 26% found the plan to be 
in good faith. Thus, in the absence of a relationship, one would expect to find 
the same percentage of good faith findings in opinions that discuss Factor 2. 
However, 75% of opinions discussing Factor 2 also found good faith, and 
opinions that did not discuss Factor 2 only found good faith 22% of the time. 
Only one of the opinions discussing Factor 2 was decided after BAFJA.301 
Table 2 depicts this relationship. 
TABLE 2: Relationship Between Discussing Factor 2 and Finding Good Faith 
 
Factor 2 discussion – 
substantial repayment 
above the § 1325(a)(4) “best 
interests of creditors” test 
Good Faith Finding 
No Yes Total 


















Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The p-value from a two-sided 
Fisher’s exact test is 0.052. 
 
 300  One possible limitation to this conclusion occurs when a court chooses to discuss all the good faith 
factors as a matter of course. However, this was a rare occurrence in this study’s data set.  
 301  See Ingram v. Burchard, 482 B.R. 313 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
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A statistically significant relationship also exists between a listing of Factor 
7 (a debtor’s special circumstances) and a finding of good faith. Just as before, 
in the absence of such a relationship, one would expect courts to find good 
faith for cases that list Factor 7 at the same rate that they find good faith for the 
entire set of analyzed cases (i.e., 26.2%). However, cases that list Factor 7 
found good faith only 12.0% of the time, and cases that did not list Factor 7 
found good faith 36.1% of the time. Table 2 depicts this relationship. 
Of the four cases that listed Factor 7 and found good faith, only one also 
discussed Factor 7.302 This supports the Puffer court’s guidance that fee-only 
plans should only be allowed when special circumstances exist, which will be 
“relatively rare.”303 However, of the twenty-four cases that listed Factor 7 and 
did not find good faith, only six cases also discussed Factor 7. All six cases 
found the debtor to lack special circumstances weighing in favor of good 
faith.304 Thus, the negative influence of listing Factor 7 on a finding of good 
faith may have little practical significance. Perhaps it suggests that before they 
reject a debtor’s plan for lack of good faith, courts tend to ensure that no 
exigent circumstances exist that would justify a small repayment to general 
unsecured creditors. 
TABLE 3: Relationship Between Listing Factor 7 and Finding Good Faith 
 
Factor 7 listing – Debtor’s 
Special Circumstances 
Good Faith Finding 
No Yes Total 


















Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The p-value from a chi-square 
test with one degree of freedom is 0.035. 
 
 302  In re Molina, 420 B.R. 825, 829 & n.11 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2009) (finding this factor to support good 
faith where “[t]here appear to be no special circumstances driving this filing (other than the collection action); 
the cost of caring for the grandson appears to be a relatively small incremental one over what would be [the] 
[d]ebtor’s expenses for herself”). 
 303  Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 304 Ingram, 482 B.R. at 323; In re Arlen, 461 B.R. 550, 555 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2011); In re McDonald, 
437 B.R. 278, 293 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010); In re Pearson, 398 B.R. 97, 102 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2008); In re 
Shelton, 370 B.R. 861, 868–69 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2007); In re Lancaster. 280 B.R. 468, 482 (W.D. Mo. 2002). 
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2. Significant Relationships Between Factors Discussed in the Same Case 
A statistically significant relationship exists between discussion of Factor 9 
(the debtor’s employment history and prospects) and three other factors. First, 
Factor 9 discussion is a significant predictor of a discussion of Factor 3 (plan 
duration). Factor 3 was discussed in approximately 23.0% of the analyzed 
cases, and in the absence of a relationship, one would expect to find the same 
percentage in cases that discuss both Factor 3 and Factor 9. However, analyzed 
cases that discuss Factor 9 also discuss Factor 3 approximately 71.4% of the 
time, and cases that did not discuss Factor 9 only discussed Factor 3 
approximately 16.7% of the time. Table 3 depicts this relationship.  
TABLE 4: Relationship Between Discussion of Factors 9 and 3 
 
Factor 9 – Debtor’s 
Employment History & 
Prospects 
Factor 3 – Plan Duration 
Not Discussed Discussed Total 


















Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The p-value from a two-sided 
Fisher’s exact test is 0.005. 
Next, Factor 9 discussion was a significant predictor of a discussion of 
Factor 5 (past bankruptcy filings). Factor 5 was discussed in approximately 
23.0% of the analyzed cases, and in the absence of a relationship, one would 
expect to again find the same percentages in cases that discuss both Factor 5 
and Factor 9. However, in the analyzed cases that also discuss Factor 9, 
approximately 71.4% of those discuss Factor 5. Analyzed cases that did not 
discuss Factor 9 only discussed Factor 5 approximately 16.7% of the time. 
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TABLE 5: Relationship Between Discussion of Factors 9 and 5 
 
Factor 9 – Debtor’s 
Employment History & 
Prospects 
Factor 5 – Past Filings 
Not Discussed Discussed Total 


















Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The p-value from a two-sided 
Fisher’s exact test is 0.005. 
Finally, Factor 9 discussion was a significant predictor of a discussion of 
Factor 11 (fairness to creditors). Factor 11 was discussed in 9.8% of the 
analyzed cases, but was discussed in approximately 57.1% of the analyzed 
cases that also discussed Factor 9. Analyzed cases that did not discuss Factor 9 
only discussed Factor 11 approximately 3.7% of the time. Table 5 depicts this 
relationship. 
TABLE 6: Relationship Between Discussion of Factors 9 and 11 
 
Factor 9 – Debtor’s 
Employment History & 
Prospects 
Factor 11 – Fairness to Creditors 
Not Discussed Discussed Total 


















Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The p-value from a two-sided 
Fisher’s exact test is 0.001. 
One could draw several conclusions from the correlation between Factor 9 
and the three other factors. When a debtor proposes little or no payment to 
general unsecured creditors, a court may look to the debtor’s employment 
prospects to determine whether fluctuations in the debtor’s income are likely. 
Again, the projected disposable income test is the statutory requirement for 
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repayment,305 but the extent to which the debtor attempts to hide or downplay 
such fluctuations in his disposable income prior to confirmation reflects on the 
debtor’s good faith in proposing and filing the plan. Seven cases either discuss 
Factor 9 and Factor 3, or Factor 9 and Factor 5. In both circumstances, six of 
the seven cases found bad faith. The correlation between employment 
prospects and past filings seems to reflect cases in which debtors file for 
chapter 13 after receiving a recent chapter 7 discharge.306 
A statistically significant relationship also exists between Factor 6 (the 
debtor’s honesty and the accuracy of schedules and statements) and Factor 4 
(the total debt and nature of the debt). Factor 4 was discussed in approximately 
36.1% of the analyzed cases. However, analyzed cases that discussed Factor 6 
also discussed Factor 4 approximately 72.2% of the time, and analyzed cases 
that did not discuss Factor 6 only discussed Factor 4 approximately 20.9% of 
the time. Table 6 depicts this relationship. This correlation suggests that courts, 
when examining cases with wrongfully-obtained debt or nondischargeable debt 
in chapter 7, look especially to the debtor’s behavior during chapter 13 
proceedings to assess the debtor’s honesty and willingness to be forthright with 
the court. 
TABLE 7: Relationship Between Discussion of Factors 6 and 4 
 
Factor 6 – Debtor’s 
Honesty & Accuracy of 
Schedules & Statements 
Factor 4 – Total, Nature, and Type of 
General Unsecured Debts 
Not Discussed Discussed Total 


















Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The p-value from a chi-square 
test with one degree of freedom is less than 0.0001. 
 
 305  11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (2012). 
 306  See, e.g., In re Keach, 225 B.R. 264, 269 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1998) (discussing Factor 9 and Factor 5 in a 
chapter 13 plan seeking to discharge debt that was nondischargeable in a recent chapter 7 case). 
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IV.  DISCUSSION 
This Part begins by discussing the study’s findings within the context of the 
current judicial landscape and the relative benefits of bright-line or 
discretionary rules for fee-only plans. Then, this Part will discuss two possible 
modifications for fee-only plans in light of the study’s findings, theoretical 
backdrop, and the Puffer decision. This Part does not intend to overstate the 
significance of the empirical analysis. Attaching empirical data to a subjective 
standard is difficult, particularly within the very specific context of fee-only 
plans. Rather, this Part offers general thoughts on how courts might approach 
the fee-only issue in the future. 
A. Muddy Versus Bright-Line Rules 
So far, three circuits have rejected a bright-line standard for fee-only plans, 
notwithstanding the Puffer court’s more focused approach of determining 
whether the debtor’s special circumstances sufficiently support a finding of 
good faith.307 Whether courts should adhere to a bright-line rule or adopt a 
more discretionary approach hinges on, among other considerations, the 
purpose of the standard and the competency of judges to make informed 
decisions.308 Murky standards requiring fact-intensive, case-specific judicial 
determinations often encounter criticism and resistance.309 But Congress has 
repeatedly declined to further articulate the chapter 13 good faith provision; 
 
 307  See Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78, 82–83 (1st Cir. 2012); Sikes v. Crager (In re 
Crager), 691 F.3d 671, 675–77 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 308  See generally Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence and Statutory 
Design, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 560–61 (2001) (citing Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 
STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988)) (discussing bright-line and discretionary rules in bankruptcy law in light of factors 
such as judicial competency). 
 309  See, e.g., ROBERT W. HAMILTON, JONATHAN R. MACEY & DOUGLAS K. MILL, CORPORATIONS 
INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 213–14 (11th ed. 2010) (discussing the 
criticism of the vague standard for corporate veil-piercing cases, for which some courts have articulated 
multiple factors to consider). 
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thus, the legislative intent to maintain a murky standard seems clear.310 
Accordingly, courts have made clear that the test is ambiguous and flexible.311 
Ted Janger’s research offers support for the flexible standard.312 Janger 
compared the use of bright-line (“crystalline”) and discretionary (“muddy”) 
standards in bankruptcy law.313 He concluded that regardless of the level of 
competence one assumes in a judge, the “muddy” rules have merit.314 Janger 
also explored research that suggests good faith clauses in contracts promote 
optimal levels of cooperation better than an alternative bright-line rule.315 
Janger found that this analysis has merit in business bankruptcies, where 
insolvent creditors act collectively to dismantle an insolvent debtor.316 
However, consumer bankruptcy is less about preserving an ongoing 
relationship between parties and more of a one-time transaction, often with 
lower stakes than a business bankruptcy.317 Furthermore, complying with the 
chapter 13 good faith standard is the sole responsibility of the debtor and 
usually does not require negotiation with creditors or the trustee. The chapter 
13 debtor must weigh the benefits of a particular plan proposal against the risk 
of encountering an objection to confirmation under § 1325(a)(3) or (7).318 
 
 310  See In re Mathis, No. 12-05618-8, 2013 WL 153833, at *9 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Jan. 15, 2013) 
(discussing Congress’s silence on defining “good faith” in the chapter 13 statute); In re Buck, 432 B.R. 13, 20 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2010) (quoting Keach v. Boyajian (In re Keach), 243 B.R. 851, 856 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000)) 
(noting the lack of a definition, courts’ varying approaches to interpretation, and that “Congress presumably 
used the phrase ‘good faith’ in its ordinary sense”), vacated sub nom. Buck v. Pappalardo (In re Buck), 
No. 08-43918, 2014 WL 1347216 (D. Mass. April 2, 2014). 
 311  Alt v. United States (In re Alt), 305 F.3d 413, 419 (6th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted); In re Thomas, 
443 B.R. 213, 217 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2010) (citing Kitchens v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co. (In re 
Kitchens), 702 F.2d 885, 889 (11th Cir. 1983)). 
 312  See generally Janger, supra note 308, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 559. 
 313  See id. 
 314  Id. at 564–65. 
 315  Id. at 603–04 (citing Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete 
Contracts, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159 (1994)). Hadfield’s research suggests that in absence of an express term in a 
contract, parties tend to operate at a suboptimal level of cooperation, because the individual costs of 
cooperation outweigh the shared benefits. Good faith clauses try to solve this problem by promoting a more 
optimal level of effort by introducing the risk of liability under the standard. Since they lack full information, 
judges are unable to identify the optimal level of effort for a given contract. Thus, instead of judicial searching 
for a bright-line rule, a muddy good faith standard promotes efficiency across “a broader range of contractual 
types and reduce[s] the costs associated with overcompliance.” Id.  
 316  Id. at 604.  
 317  Id. at 596–98. 
 318  For the trustee and creditors, the likely calculus is comparing the litigation costs to the value of raising 
the objection. Assuming the trustee or creditor prevails, the value ranges from forcing the debtor to amend the 
plan, which may provide for an only slightly greater repayment, to effectively barring a discharge altogether. 
See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(5) (2012) (on objection from the trustee or any party in interest, allowing the court to 
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While he did not discuss good faith provisions in bankruptcy law, Janger 
prescribed muddy standards in consumer bankruptcy where one expects 
abuse.319 Since curbing abuse in the bankruptcy system is the hallmark of the 
good faith provisions, Janger’s prescription suggests that good faith analysis 
should remain muddy.320 A muddy standard is also favorable to a per se 
approach because fee-only plans raise a particularly strong suspicion of 
abuse.321 This study offers some support for this proposition because the 
findings suggest that courts are using the totality of the circumstances test to its 
fullest extent. Given that only one of thirteen factors that the study coded for 
discussion was significantly correlated with a finding of good faith, courts 
seem to be deciding fee-only cases based on various factors. In light of this 
finding, is there a need to modify the totality of the circumstances approach to 
good faith analysis for fee-only plans? 
One option of course is to retain the test. While courts usually find fee-only 
plans to be in bad faith, Crager reminds us that these plans may still satisfy 
good faith given the debtor’s particular circumstances.322 Crager reaches this 
conclusion without modifying the totality of the circumstances test or taking a 
per se approach.323 This study may provide support for this approach, first with 
its finding that the general unsecured repayment is not a significant predictor 
of good faith, which suggests that bad faith requires something more than zero 
or nominal repayment. Second, despite all of the possible correlations between 
factor discussion and good faith, or between combinations of factors discussed, 
this study found relatively few that were statistically significant. Finally, while 
the data does demonstrate that courts tend to narrow their factor discussion 
when finding bad faith, judges did not focus on any particular set of factors.  
 
dismiss the case or convert to chapter 7 if confirmation is denied for any reason under § 1325, which includes 
for lack of good faith). Although, the Code provides the debtor with a broad right to convert the case to a 
chapter 7 proceeding, which if approved by the court, will likely result in a discharge. See id. § 1307(a). 
 319  Janger, supra note 308, at 601. 
 320  See Deans v. O’Donnell (In re Deans), 692 F.2d 968, 972 (4th Cir. 1982) (emphasis added) (quoting 9 
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 9.20 at 319 (14th ed. 1978)) (following other circuits by defining good faith as a 
provision where “[a] comprehensive definition of good faith is not practical . . . the basic inquiry should be 
whether or not under the circumstances of the case there has been an abuse of the provisions, purpose, or spirit 
of [the Chapter] in the proposal or plan”). 
 321  See, e.g., Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2012); In re Barnes, No. 12-
06613-8, 2013 WL 153848, at *10 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Jan. 15, 2013). 
 322  Sikes v. Crager (In re Crager), 691 F.3d 671, 675, 677 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 323  Id. at 675–77. 
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The remainder of this Part discusses two other possible modifications to 
good faith analysis in fee-only plans: follow the Puffer special circumstances 
approach or issue a sua sponte order for fee-only plans. 
B. A Modified Approach 
Recall that the First Circuit’s opinion in Puffer may be read (on remand, 
the bankruptcy court did) to adopt a modified approach to fee-only plans: 
requiring the debtor to show special circumstances that sufficiently indicate 
good faith.324 Whether or not this is what the court actually meant—versus 
merely indicating that special circumstances was the most important factor in 
the totality of the circumstances test325—such a modified approach may make 
sense. After all, the study found very little correlation between the good faith 
of fee-only plans and any specific variable, despite the fact that most fee-only 
plans are found in bad faith.326 
Requiring the debtor to affirmatively show special circumstances creates an 
extra hurdle for fee-only plans and moves in the direction of a more 
“crystalline” rule. One might consider this to be a “good faith-plus” 
approach:327 before a court applies the traditional totality of the circumstances 
test for good faith, a fee-only plan debtor must make an additional showing of 
special circumstances. This approach may strike an appropriate balance 
between preserving a “muddy” standard and providing a clearer presumption 
against plans courts usually view as abusive. 
Also, recall that this Comment suggests the modified-approach reading of 
Puffer is similar to the rebuttable presumption provisions in chapter 7, where 
the debtor may rebut the presumption of abuse found under the means test by 
showing special circumstances.328 The two are not completely analogous, but 
the resemblance is noteworthy. Just as showing sufficient circumstances to 
rebut the abuse presumption is difficult and infrequent,329 justifying a fee-only 
 
 324  See supra Part II.B.1. 
 325  See supra Part II.B.1. 
 326  Only 26% of the total cases in this study’s data set passed the good faith test. See also supra note 79. 
 327  This term is merely illustrative and, to the author’s knowledge, has not been used in this context 
anywhere else. 
 328  Supra notes 164–64 and accompanying text.  
 329  Anthony P. Cali, Note, The “Special Circumstance” of Student Loan Debt Under the Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 473, 485–86 (2010) (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that many courts describe the special circumstances of 
§ 707(b)(2)(B) as “effectively off limits for most debtors” and “uncommon, unusual, exceptional, distinct, 
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plan with special circumstances, Puffer tells us, will be “relatively rare.”330 The 
legislative intent behind the chapter 7 abuse rebuttal provision is to provide an 
exception to the means test for “debtors whose special circumstances require 
adjustments to income or expenses that place them in dire need of chapter 7 
relief.”331 Showing special circumstances to justify fee-only plans would 
presumably serve a very similar purpose: because of his special circumstances, 
the debtor is in dire need of chapter 13 relief, and thus an otherwise abusive 
fee-only plan is justifiable. Such a rule shifts the burden to the debtor to 
affirmatively present special circumstances. 
In response to the modified approach, a debtor proposing would have 
several options: (1) affirmatively show special circumstances; (2) propose a 
higher repayment to general unsecured creditors (perhaps while also showing 
special circumstances); or (3) do not file for chapter 13 relief. These responses 
have potential benefits: (1) they promote higher repayment to general 
unsecured creditors; (2) courts use fewer resources when litigating plans that 
are likely to be abusive; and (3) courts have more complete information about 
the debtor’s particular circumstances. 
This approach could be implemented in two ways. The first is through 
judicial precedent, like the Puffer decision (again, if it is indeed adopting a 
modified approach). With judicial precedent, fee-only plans would only be 
subjected to this modified rule when a party objects to the plan on good faith 
grounds, or during the court’s review of the plan at the confirmation stage. 
Knowing that the plan is even more likely to fail under a modified approach, 
this implementation could serve as a powerful deterrent from filing fee-only 
plans in the first place. 
The second implementation is through a sua sponte order, which courts 
have similarly used for to implement the presumptively reasonable, or “no-
look,” fee scheme for attorney compensation.332 This order might state that a 
fee-only plan is presumptively in bad faith (or unreasonable), in violation of 
 
peculiar, particular, additional or extra conditions or facts”); Lauren E. Tribble, Note, Judicial Discretion and 
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention Act, 57 DUKE L.J. 789, 802–03 (2007). 
 330  Berliner v. Pappalardo (In re Puffer), 674 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 331  S. REP. NO. 106-49, at 7 (1999) (report from the Senate Committee on the Judiciary); see also Cali, 
supra note 329, at 485 (discussing the legislative history of § 707(b)(2)(B)). 
 332  See Lupica, supra note 56, at 40. Nevertheless, courts may still scrutinize a “presumptively 
reasonable” fee. Id. at 40–41 & n. 58; see also, e.g., In re Debtor’s Attorney’s Fees in Chapter 13 Cases, 374 
B.R. 903, 903, 906–09 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007) (establishing, sua sponte, a presumptively reasonable fee plan, 
but also allowing any party in interest to object to the fee within ten days of the fee award). 
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§ 1325(a)(3) and § 1325(a)(7), and requires debtor to list special 
circumstances. Compared to implementation through judicial precedent, a sua 
sponte order provides more procedural clarity and may be an even stronger 
deterrent from filing a fee-only plan, as the order firmly assigns the debtor with 
the burden of showing special circumstances, regardless of whether an 
objection is raised.  
C. Challenges to Implementing a Modified Approach 
Regardless of how it is implemented, a modified approach in practice does 
become more of a bright-line rule, and as such, presents challenges. Creating a 
modified approach for fee-only plans under the good faith provisions—
whether through case law or a sua sponte order—begs the question of what 
qualifies as a fee-only plan. Although the precise line is far from clear now, 
adopting a modified rule would likely bring this issue to the forefront, as 
debtors may seek to avoid the rule by arguing their plan does not qualify as 
fee-only. Would a court draw a somewhat arbitrary line at a 2% or less 
repayment to unsecured creditors, as this study did for empirical analysis 
purposes? What if, instead, the court defines fee-only in terms of the 
percentage of total plan payments that fund attorney fees? Regarding the latter, 
what should be the threshold percentage to qualify as a fee-only plan? 
Even if a court establishes a workable threshold for fee-only plans, no 
matter where the court sets it, debtors will propose a plan that just barely 
avoids qualifying as a fee-only plan, thereby avoiding the special 
circumstances requirement. This highlights Janger’s prescription for using 
muddy standards instead of bright-line rules where one expects abuse.333 Once 
the rule becomes crystal clear, fee-only debtors will move up to, but not over, 
the line of abuse. If, on the other hand, it is unclear exactly what constitutes a 
fee-only plan, debtors remain subject to the court’s discretion. And that leads 
to one of the primary benefits of a muddy standard: for the court to take 
debtors as they come to bankruptcy, in light of all their circumstances.  
CONCLUSION 
Three circuit courts have made clear that a per se approach to fee-only 
plans should not replace the totality of the circumstances standard for 
 
 333  Janger, supra note 308, at 601. 
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determining good faith.334 By requiring debtors to justify fee-only plans 
through special circumstances, one of those decisions, Puffer, adds some teeth 
to the prevailing view that fee-only plans are usually bad faith.335 
In light of the Puffer court’s shift to a more rigid rule, this Comment 
conducted an empirical analysis of chapter 13 fee-only and low percentage 
plans to shed light on the actual application of the current good faith standard. 
The findings show that, even within the context of fee-only plans, which are 
usually found to be in bad faith, courts are not always finding bad faith for the 
same reasons. The study reveals that a court narrows its focus when finding 
bad faith but not on any particular set of factors. Such a result may favor the 
current totality of the circumstances standard.  
This Comment, however, suggests Puffer strikes an appropriate balance 
between retaining the subjective test and placing a heavier burden on the 
debtor to justify a fee-only plan. This analysis makes a modest attempt to build 
upon the discussion of good faith in chapter 13, as courts continue to wrestle 
with balancing the debtor’s fresh start with a fair distribution to creditors. The 
discussion might benefit from a further study of all chapter 13 good faith 
litigation regardless of the amount of repayment to general unsecured creditors. 
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